Abstract:
I provide an overview of the main themes, claims, and arguments in support of those claims that form the substance of my book, Self-Expression (OUP, 2007; paperback issue, 2011). I then summarize some recently published comments upon and challenges to certain of those claims and arguments offered by Bar-On (2010), Eriksson (2010), Martin (2010), and Moore (2010). Next, I reply to those comments and challenges, in some cases by clarification of what is in the book, and in other cases by refinement and elaboration thereof. I close with some glimpses ahead to lines of research that I intend to pursue in further development of the book’s main theses.

Much work in philosophy, including ethics, meta-ethics, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, and aesthetics, makes some appeal to the notion of expression.¹ For instance meta-ethicists often stress how ethical discourse (“Torture is wrong!”) expresses attitudes, while the philosophy of language rests heavily upon the ability of speech acts to express states of mind (assertions express belief, promises express intentions, etc.). Surprisingly little effort, however, has gone into elucidating the notion, or notions of expression thus invoked. In my book, Self-Expression (Oxford, 2007; paperback, 2011), I offer a general account of a cluster of notions variously indicated by the terms ‘expression’ and ‘self-expression’. On that basis, the book also offers a view of what is involved in producing behavior or artifacts that are expressive of a state of mind without expressing that state of mind. In so doing it ranges into aesthetics.

I. Overview of Self-Expression

Self-Expression is so called in order to mark out my subject matter from those phenomena in which words express ideas or concepts, and sentences express propositions. I take that relation to be a matter of human convention and thus no more in need of explanation than other ways in which we institute linguistic

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conventions. My focus is instead the various ways in which we express ourselves that may but need not involve conventions. For instance, unless we suspect her of dissimulating, it’s natural to describe Alicia, who is clenching her fist and scowling, as expressing not just anger, but her anger. Later on, Alicia’s lingering gaze might express her love for the gaze’s target. Such behavior can be stylized by individual idiosyncracy or culture-specific display rules, but need not be. Instead, what is important is that in so behaving Alicia manifests her anger and love, respectively. The core intuition driving the analysis of the book is that in self-expression we designedly manifest, display, show, or “press out” something within, and in particular something about our mental lives. That intuition obliges me to elucidate the relevant notions of design, and a relevant member of the cluster: manifest-display-show, etc. Among these I choose showing as the most instructive.

A methodological point: In spite of appealing to our everyday discourse about ‘expression’ and cognates to motivate an overall approach, it is central to the methodology of *Self-Expression* that the elucidation of its target notion not be purely *a priori*. As such the project is not committed to providing a theory of self-expression conforming to all of our intuitive judgments and everyday ways of speaking about that phenomenon. For instance, it emerges in Chapter Five that although we intuitively take scowling typically to express anger, it is consistent with the position I defend that we could discover that scowling is not, even in general, an expression of anger. This is something we could find out in the way that we could find out that lemons are not fruits. How could we end up being so wrong about scowling? To answer this question I’ll need to set out more of the theory.

In an Introductory chapter (“The Significance of Self-Expression”) giving an overview of the book, I consider four very general models of communication in order to see whether one of them might be both plausible on its own and well suited to show how self-expression relates to other forms of communication. These are the Code Model (communicating is the encoding and then decoding of information), the Inferential Model (in communicating we provide our audience with information from which they can infer the content and force of our message), the Extended Senses Model (in communicating we use one another as if they were prosthetic devices extending the power and range of our own senses), and the Signaling Model (in communicating we convey information by design). After finding limitations with the first three of these, I opt for the Signaling Model due to its generality and, as such, its ability to accommodate what is right about its three rivals. I define a signal as a feature of an object that both conveys information and was designed to convey the
information that it does. The notion of design here is meant to include but
not be limited to human intention. Accordingly, if as a matter of evolution-
ary fact, the bright coloration on a tree frog functions to convey to potential
predators that its owner is poisonous, then that coloration is a signal in the
relevant sense. At the same time, if I tell you that it’s snowing outside with
the intention of informing you about the weather, then my utterance is also a
signal. By contrast, I produce carbon dioxide when I breathe, and mosquitoes
use that fact as a clue to the proximity of blood. However, there is no reason to
think that my production of carbon dioxide subserves, even in part, the func-
tion of conveying information to such predators. As such there’s no reason to
think that my production of this gas is a signal.

Where does self-expression live in this signaling landscape? Chapter Two
(“Expression Delineated”) sets out twenty dicta about self-expression pre-
sented as either self-evident, plausible on reflection, or to be justified in the
following chapters. Among the more significant are: A self-expression shows
a thought, feeling or experience; a self-expression is not a type of statement; a
self-expression may be involuntary, voluntary, or both voluntary and willed;
self-expression falls into overt and non–overt varieties; we can express ourselves
by means of “sayings in our heart”; dramatic performances, when expressive,
need not involve self-expression. In light of these and other dicta, I suggest that
in self-expression we designedly show what’s within. In scowling, for instance, I
can show my anger, and in sending an appropriate thank you note I can show
my appreciation for your having sent me a gift on my birthday. But showing
comes in three forms:

*Showing that*: Here one makes available evidence that enables one to infer the
truth of a proposition. (I show you that I’m angry at you by smashing
up your car.)

*Showing α* (where α is a perceptible object or affair): Here one makes an
object perceptible. (I show you my bruise by rolling up my sleeve and
presenting you with my bruised arm.)

*Showing how* some emotion or experience feels or appears: Here I do something
that puts you in a position to empathize with my emotion, or to know
what an experience of mine is like. (For the former case, that might
consist in describing my situation in a way that enables you to imagine
your way into my shoes; for the latter case that might involve exploiting
the affinity between, for instance, certain colors and certain sounds).
I argue that the showing involved in self-expression can take any of these three forms. Characteristically but by no means without exception, speech acts show mental states in the showing—that way; facial expression, often coupled with intonation and other non-verbal behavior, shows states of mind, in particular emotions, in the showing $\alpha$ way; non-verbal behavior, as well as artifacts like painting, music, and sculpture, show how an emotion or experience feels. When these activities are also designed to convey the information that they do, they also express what they show. By contrast, the bulging vein on my forehead resulting from my feeling of rage might well show that rage. However, unless there’s reason to think that vein-bulging is an adaptation whose purpose is to convey information about my affect, or is something I produce at will, it shows without expressing anger. The same goes for scowling: Common sense takes it to be unlike vein-bulging in this very respect, but common sense could be wrong. For all we currently know, developments in the evolutionary biology of facial expression could convince us that scowling is not an information-conveying adaptation after all. Perhaps its role is to prepare the teeth for attack, and its ability to convey information is just an unselected by-product of that. If so, that would then place scowling in a position like that of lemons-as-vegetables.

After the conceptual groundwork laid out in the first two chapters, the remainder of the book is devoted in large part to expounding and defending the above-mentioned correlations between expressive behaviors and the three types of showing. Building on earlier work of Wayne Davis (1992, 2003), Chapter Three (“Showing and Meaning”) defends a new notion of speaker meaning eschewing reflexive communicative intentions. Speaker meaning is there defined as a matter of intentionally and overtly showing a perceptible object, intentional state, or mode of commitment. Drawing on Sperber and Wilson (1995), overtness is therein glossed as intentionally making something manifest, while also intending to make one’s intention to do so itself manifest. On that basis I develop an account of how speech acts that have sincerity conditions (like assertions and promises, and unlike appointings), can express the states that those sincerity conditions mandate. This account draws on recent work in the evolutionary biology of communication, including the so-called Handicap Principle as articulated by, e.g., Maynard Smith and Harper (2004).²

Chapter Four (“Meaningful Expression”) develops the relation of self-expression to speaker meaning. In particular, I argue that overt forms of self-expression are also cases of speaker meaning. These may but need not involve speech acts: an overt scowl can also fit the bill. These behaviors, arguably more

² I refine and defend this idea more fully in Green 2009.
primitive than speech acts, can also show psychological states in the showing-a-way. That is, some forms of self-expression also make what they express perceptible. This claim is defended by appeal to the fact that the so-called basic emotions are complexes of components including at least dispositions to behavior, physiological responses, and experiential states. Each of these components is characteristic of the emotion of which it is a part, just as skin of a certain color is a characteristic component of the apple of which it is a part. I argue by appeal to these considerations that a facial expression can make an emotion literally perceptible. This position is further developed in light of recent work in the experimental psychology of facial expression. Chapter Five ("Facial Expression") explains the opposition between two major views in this field, which I term the Neurocultural View (associated with Paul Ekman and his collaborators) and the Behavioral Ecology View (associated with Alan Fridlund and his collaborators). I argue that the opposition between these two views rests on a number of confusions, and they can be made compatible with one another with minor alterations in their formulations. These alterations produce what I term the Strategic Readout View, on which facial expressions show what’s within while at the same time conforming to the general tenets of behavior ecology: that is, they are strategically guided and depend, for their efficacy, upon the contours of the niche in which they have evolved.¹

Chapter Six ("Convention and Idiosyncrasy") traces the development of self-expression from relatively natural cases, such as pan-cultural facial expressions, to expressive behavior modified by local cultural norms or individual peculiarities. The former include so-called display rules, in which a given culture modifies an otherwise natural tendency to express oneself: some cultures will, for instance, proscribe smiling under certain conditions even when people are inclined to do so. Alongside that, one person might have a unique way of expressing, say, surprise that only those who know her well can appreciate. Such idiosyncrasies can, however, propagate among a population and develop into display rules over time. Further, I argue that once conventionalized systems of self-expression are in place, an avowal of attitude behaves like a measurement thereof by mapping attitudinal contents into the logical space of propositions. This idea exploits and develops the "measurement analogy" as it applies to attitude ascription as defended by Matthews 2007. Yet whereas Matthews defends the analogy on behalf of the indeterminacy of attitudinal content, I argue that an equally good case supports an indeterminacy of attitudinal modality: there may be no fact of the matter whether, for instance, a state of an agent is belief

¹ Stout 2010 raises some challenges for my position on the perceptibility of emotions, and Green 2010b replies to those challenges.
or degree of belief. The chapter closes with a discussion of a specialized device that some languages have developed for attitude expression—sometimes called the force indicator—and I develop a formal semantics and pragmatics for this device.

The seventh and final chapter of the book, “Expressive Qualities”, focuses on expressiveness as a development from self-expression proper. An actor’s performance can be expressive of remorse without her expressing any remorse of her own, and a common feature of both artworks and performances is that they can be expressive in this way. Such artistic expressiveness tends also to exemplify our third form of showing, in which we show how an emotion or experience feels. This is where empathy has its home: one who shows how an emotion or experience feels enables others to know how they feel, and they activate such knowledge by imagining their way into the expresser’s shoes. I take musical expression as a central and challenging case, arguing that one of the most successful theories in the field, Kivy’s “contour and convention theory” (2002) is plausible so far as it goes but fails to account for non-structural aspects of music’s expressiveness—for instance why it is that a minor key sounds sad. Drawing on the well-established phenomenon of intermodal congruence—in which for instance one color is felt to be more similar to a certain sound than another color is—I hypothesize an unconscious appreciation of a congruence as well between certain experiences and certain emotions. This enables me to explain how certain non-structural aspects of music can have—or be naturally felt to have—certain affective qualities. I extend the approach to expressive qualities of representations, showing how a photo can express admiration or a sculpture a sense of grandeur laid waste.

II. Elaborations and Replies

In what follows I will elaborate upon and clarify some of the issues that have generated replies from other authors, while showing that those authors’ concerns about the programme as well as some of the main contentions of the book may be allayed.

1. What’s in the Name?

Michael Martin (Martin 2010) remarks that in spite of the book’s title, its principal topic is expression rather than self-expression. He also observes that
nowhere in the book do I explicitly define expression as distinct from self-expression. I refrain from doing so because the notion of expression seems to me too inchoate a phenomenon on which to build a theory. This concern is voiced by the remark I cite from Ogden and Richards, who describe ‘express’ as having a curiously narcotic effect on those who use it (1923, p. 231). My strategy in Self-Expression is instead to take the fundamental phenomenon to be that of self-expression, in which we designedly show an introspectible state of ourselves. Such states may be cognitive (beliefs, opinions), affective (emotions and moods) or experiential (sensations). Further, I propose an explanation of how other uses of ‘expression’ and its cognates are derivative from this notion of self-expression. Thus for instance while expressiveness (of the sort we find in the arts, where the artist need not be expressing an attitude of her own) is possible without self-expression, we only understand the former as a development out of and refinement of the latter. Similar remarks apply to what Martin calls vicarious expression, such as what occurs in a herald’s expressing the king’s contempt. Martin is dissatisfied with my way of contrasting expression with self-expression, however, remarking, ‘Self-expression contrasts with expression more generally in that the object of expression is the self per se rather than just some emotional state, or some opinion.’ The suggestion appears to be that in self-expression we express the self without thereby expressing any particular component thereof, such as a cognitive, affective or experiential state. I would contest this, simply because I doubt that the notion of expression of the self per se has any clear sense. In answer to the question, how did Samuel express himself?, we always expect something referring to an affective, cognitive or experiential state, or perhaps all three: anger, fear, conviction, contempt, are all paradigms, and in some cases the expressing act makes clear the object of the state expressed, such as the fact that the contempt was directed at the government rather than a colleague. We also express congeries of states of the self. When a congeries of such states is relatively stable and unified, it often becomes a sensibility, which is an inchoate set of dispositions to favor, disfavor, link, and emphasize, assortments of items of like category. A ‘Goth’ sensibility will favor, disfavor, etc., certain kinds of music, ways of dressing, and landscapes; and will disfavor others. A camp sensibility, by contrast, will favor, disfavor, etc., a distinct set of objects, behaviors, and so on. One can certainly express a Goth or camp sensibility, but in doing so one is simply expressing a pattern of specific likes, dislikes and so on. I see no reason to believe, then, that there is such a thing as expressing one’s self per se. Martin’s reason for holding otherwise seems to be that in contemporary popular culture, the exhortation to express oneself is often a call to do more than express a belief (or other cognitive state),
emotion, mood, or experience. Thus—to use his example—when in the 1990s Madonna exhorted women to express themselves, she probably intended that they do more than, say, assert a proposition they happened to believe. Rather, she more likely had it in mind that they air something in them that is hard to articulate, perhaps thereby empowering themselves and strengthening their union with (and support of) her. Madonna’s usage is no challenge to my own gloss of self-expression, however, and for two reasons. First of all, and as we have just seen, an exhortation such as hers will often point to the expression of a sensibility as opposed to a single belief, emotion, or experience. Second, we know that pragmatic phenomena allow a speaker to convey much more than what is carried by the literal meaning of her words. The running-shoe ad might tell us to Get Moving!, thereby suggesting that we engage in regular, vigorous exercise even though its advice, taken literally, would be very hard not to follow. So too, Madonna’s exhortation is charitably understood as a demand that we express something important and perhaps difficult to bring to the surface, simply because it would be facile to take her words literally. By contrast, I have aimed for an account of the literal meaning of ‘self-expression,’ expecting that speakers will use that platform together with well-attested pragmatic mechanisms to imbue their utterances with more specific contents as dictated by conversational exigencies.

2. Showing, Expressing, and Indicating

I construe self-expression as designedly showing an introspectible state. ‘Designedly’ is a terse way of requiring that the showing at issue be the result of design, be it natural selection, artificial selection, or intention. Since ‘show’ is a success verb, one does not show a state one lacks. Accordingly, my definition of ‘A expresses her B’ (2007, p. 43), implies that one can only express a cognitive, affective or experiential state B if she is in fact in state B. However, as I remark in the last section, unlike ‘self-expression’ and cognates, I do not define ‘express’ or its cognates. As a result, I am not committed to the view that one cannot express anger when one is not angry. Rather, in the book I just remain neutral on that question. John Eriksson’s (Eriksson 2010) claim to the contrary is thus inaccurate. After citing my definition of self-expression, Eriksson rightly infers that it makes self-expression a success notion. But Eriksson then continues that on my view, ‘... a person can express only a state of mind that he or she has.’ This does not follow. Instead, all that follows is that a person cannot express her state of mind unless she is in that state of mind.
It is difficult to see how this conclusion could stir controversy. Yet not least because I do not define ‘express’ and its cognates, one justifiably wonders what we should say about a person who appears to express a state of mind that she is not in fact in. Taking a cue from aesthetics, I treat many such cases under the general rubric of expressiveness. In the field of aesthetics it is generally agreed that a nonsentient artifact such as a painting can have an ‘expressive quality’: we naturally say such things as that the painting is sad. But in saying this we are not committing ourselves to the view that paintings have emotional lives; otherwise (and as O.K. Bouwsma pointed out long ago (Bouwsma 1954)) the considerate among us would respond to a sad painting by trying to cheer it up! Accordingly, it’s natural to treat an actor’s portrayal of a character expressing anger not as the actor expressing her anger, but rather as a performance that is expressive of anger. A further account of expressiveness in the arts is offered in Chapter Seven, and is the topic of Joe Moore’s discussion and my replies to it in Section 7 below.

What, then, shall we say of a speech act in which one seems to express a state of mind one lacks? Insincere promises, hollow thanks, and lies are all cases of this kind. Here Eriksson rightly points out that I do well to offer an account of such cases, and so I do. The definition of Illocutionary Speaker Meaning (2007, p. 73) entails that one performing a speech act intends to make manifest that she is committed to a proposition under a certain mode. Simply because commitment is closed under deduction while belief is not, one can be committed to a proposition without believing that proposition. Furthermore, one can intend to make a propositional commitment manifest without being in a state that makes that commitment sincere. Thus in asserting that P I intend to manifest my commitment to P (in an assertoric way—characterized on pp. 71-3), but I can intend this without believing that P. Assuming that the speech act of thanking takes propositional contents, we may also see that thanking is possible in the absence of felt gratitude.4 Eriksson’s presumption to the contrary about what my position implies is thus also off the mark.

Eriksson contrasts my approach to expression with an account developed by Wayne Davis. On Davis’ account, expressing a psychological state is a matter of doing something with the, or an, aim of providing an indication that one is in that state. To clarify this, Davis first defines indication: ‘A indicates B’ says roughly that there is a causal or statistical relation between A and B in virtue of which A would give a suitably placed observer a reason to expect B.’ (2003, p. 47). On that basis, Davis goes on to define expression: ‘S expresses Ψ iff S

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4 I develop a further account of the norms guiding thanking and asserting in Green 2009.
performs an observable act as an indication of occurrent \( \Psi \) without thereby covertly simulating an unintentional indication of \( \Psi \).’ (2003, p. 59). It won’t be necessary to explain here the ‘without thereby covertly simulating...’ clause. Rather, what is important is that ‘as an indication’ is to be read as meaning that the agent intends her act to be an indication—with that term understood as just defined. Davis’ account leaves open the possibility of expressing a state that one is not in, but Eriksson observes that as such, I have no reason to dispute Davis’ position. After all, he contends, Davis is theorizing about expression while I’m theorizing about self-expression.

This resolution of our dispute is, however, too pat, for there are independent reasons for doubting the adequacy of Davis’ analysis. I’ve argued elsewhere (2007b) that Davis’ analysis is not sufficient for expression: it counts as expression cases that should not be so counted. To see why, observe that people can intend some odd things, not all of which have much chance of expressing their state of mind or heart. For instance, I know how to wiggle my ears. Further, wiggling my ears increases the probability that I am thinking that the Horsehead nebula is beautiful. After all, wiggling my ears shows that I am conscious, or at least awake, and I’d have to be awake to think about that Nebula. However, even if I do wiggle my ears for the purpose of indicating my nebular belief (thereby satisfying Davis’ definiens for ‘express’), wiggling them does not express that belief. Davis (2008a, b) has responded to this counterexample by remarking that if I wiggle my ears for the purpose of indicating my belief that the Horsehead Nebula is beautiful, then I have indeed expressed that belief. On behalf of this view, Davis suggests, ‘We would fail completely to understand Green if we thought that he meant nothing, and was not expressing himself in any way.’ (Davis 2008b, p. 429). Davis’ point appears to be that unless we take me as expressing a belief, there will be a fact about me that will have been missed. This is true, but does not suffice to establish Davis’ reply. The reason is that his position elides an important feature of expression. I stress in *Self-Expression* that one can express oneself without anyone cottoning on. Yet that should not occlude the familiar phenomenon of trying but failing to express oneself. This phenomenon is, indeed, so basic that I reify it (Dictum 2.1.14) as one of the twenty dicta that guide the analysis of that book.

Cases of trying but failing to express oneself fall into two kinds: (a) in instances such as ‘locked-in syndrome’ where all but one’s eyelids are paralyzed, a person might try but fail to express himself because of his radically compromised ability to move; (b) the agent is capable of actions in the usual way, but performs an action quite inappropriate to the state of mind she is intending to express. In Green 2007a, I had given the case of Mary intending to hug her
friend Celeste but inadvertently cuffing her on the ear instead. Though Celeste might be mistaken to respond resentfully, she would also be mistaken to think that Mary had expressed affection. Rather, Mary had tried but failed to express affection. Similarly, in Green 2007b, I had intended the ear-wiggling example as a clear case of expressive failure; that is, as one in which the observable action is so unrelated to the intentional state I am trying to use it to express, that I have tried but failed to express that state. Yet Davis’ reply to this example would appear to imply that such failures are impossible. As such his position fails on a benchmark that any successful theory of expression ought to respect.

Consequently, while we may be tempted to follow Eriksson’s suggestion that Davis’ account of expression be turned into an account of self-expression by adding a sincerity clause, it is not adequate as an account of expression in the first place. That, in turn, is good reason to doubt that it can be turned into an adequate account of self-expression, and thus a rival to the one I offer. After all, our counterexample to Davis’ general account of expression does not lose its force when we assume that I do in fact believe that the Crab Nebula is beautiful. In the absence of a convention, this is still not a case in which I express my belief that the Crab Nebula is beautiful. Mutatis mutandis, it is thus not a case of self-expression either.

3. Expressing and Signaling

Martin challenges one of the guiding contentions of the book, according to which expressing is a special case of signaling. He contends that in some cases expressive behavior amounts to no more than manifestation of a psychological state, and that manifestation need not take the form of a signal. Instead, Martin contends, insofar as behavior reveals a person’s psychological profile in some way, this should suffice to make it expressive. In support of this view, Martin offers the example of his former roommate, whose quivering hands left Martin unclear whether they betokened anxiety or rather a neurological cause. Martin later learned that the cause of the palsy was a mild apraxia and an incipient form of Parkinson’s, writing,

The moment I realized that, I treated his movement differently, and it looked different to me. From one perspective, low firing rates in neural centers of motor control and an emotional state of anxiety are both just internal causes of behavior. But...the latter kind of cause we classify as a psychological or mental cause of behavior; something our social competence needs to keep track of; the former, we think of as purely mechanical. So perhaps what clas-
sifies together various overt physical behaviors as expressive is just that we do so treat them as what we must track when discerning the mind of an agent (Martin 2010)

Martin concludes from this that a behavior’s being caused by a psychological state is sufficient for its expressing that state. Thus for instance, so long as a vein’s bulging on my forehead is a result of anger, then it expresses that anger whether or not its bulging was designed (by me or natural selection) to do so. This conclusion runs well beyond the evidence presented on its behalf, and will seem plausible only if we eschew the option of describing some behavior as showing a psychological state rather than expressing it. The galvanic skin response, increased adrenaline, and elevated blood pressure that all ensue upon my fear, show that fear, yet it seems highly counterintuitive to describe any of them as expressing fear. A blush shows one’s embarrassment, and while in Self-Expression I was doubtful on empirical grounds that it also expresses embarrassment, I do acknowledge that it is more natural to say that blushing expresses embarrassment than that increased adrenaline expresses fear. What accounts for this difference? I suggest that blushing, unlike the other physiological responses just mentioned, is readily detectable by others. That makes it a plausible but by no means decisive bit of intuitive psychology that blushing is designed to telegraph embarrassment. By contrast, no such thing may be said of these other responses.

I would hope, that is, that no one would be tempted to suggest that a heightened adrenaline level expresses fear. Instead, it is natural and adequate to say that it shows fear, or at least heightened affect. If that is correct, then showing a psychological state is not sufficient for expressing it, and Martin has misdiagnosed his response to his friend’s palsy. The diagnosis is not that one response imputes expressiveness while the other does not; rather the diagnosis is that one response imputes an etiology to the friend’s behavior that a (non-specialist) friend might be able to help with. By contrast, the most that most of us can do for a friend with apraxia or Parkinson’s is to seek clinical intervention and to help out with fine-motor tasks when we can. Let me stress that I do not want to downplay the importance of those behaviors that show rather than express psychological states. A great many things about a person are not plausibly expressive but nevertheless call urgently for a reaction: dramatic weight loss, increased blood pressure, lack of energy, compromised posture, and so on, and many of these have a psychological etiology calling for intervention on behalf of the person showing such symptoms. Further, my elucidation of three kinds of showing provides a framework for understanding various ways in which behavior can show a psychological state. This is why I have no reason to dis-
agree with the thrust of Martin’s remark when he writes, ‘It does not seem to me that tracking mental causes in any obvious way reduces to a concern with whether an agent has attempted to communicate or display something or not.’ I do not hold that expressive behavior is the only lens through which we can observe someone’s mind. Further, even if we do use that lens, it will view more than just what an agent attempts to communicate or display: self-expression encompasses behavior that is entirely involuntary.

4. Perceiving Emotions

Martin rightly observes that insofar as we have commonsensical, man-on-the-Clapham-omnibus support for the idea that we see, hear, or otherwise sense emotions, that support is by no means conclusive. I can see my father’s face in my daughter’s, though it’s clear that this is not to be taken literally. However, my argument for the claim that we perceive emotions is meant to bring more evidence to the table than this. I also argue that many of our emotions have characteristic ways of manifesting themselves, and this is true not just for so-called basic emotions but for many others, although these facts are not always pan-specific. (My characteristic way of manifesting affection might differ from yours.) Many emotions not only have characteristic ways of manifesting themselves, but also have characteristic components. Further, when such a component is observed, that is some reason to think that this will enable us to observe the complex—just as observation of a facing surface of an apple enables us to observe the apple. Martin makes clear that his remarks on my argument for the perceptibility of emotions are not the last word on the issue, and I would in turn highlight that there is indeed more to consider here.⁵

Martin also mentions that it is not obvious what in the overall structure of my theory requires the perceivability-of-emotions claim. True, if that claim turns out to be false, then that will not knock down the overall structure: I can just retreat to the claim that emotional displays show—that the agent is in an affective state, and perhaps also make appropriate others aware of how that state feels. Rather, what relinquishing the perceivability-of-emotions claim will do is perhaps make the structure a little less interesting. The reason is that, as I have stressed, I am not after a conceptual analysis of expression, since I’m not confident that this is the sort of phenomenon that admits of conceptual analysis. But that is to give up on one benchmark for the adequacy of this

⁵ For further discussion of this issue see Stout (2010) and Green (2010b).
theory. What may we use instead? My answer is roughly: does the theory raise interesting new questions that can guide either empirical or theoretical investigation? One such question would be whether emotions can be perceived, and whether, given the ways in which understanding others is such an integral part of social competence, people with autism might be said literally to suffer from perceptual defects.

5. Voluntary/Involuntary

Tom Pink’s example, cited by Martin, of the crotchety great-aunt is intriguing. It seems quite demanding to insist that she is behaving voluntarily when she blurts out ‘Dirty little boy; dirty little boy,’ simply on the ground that she could, if she made a great effort, stifle such comments. If Martin’s characterization is correct, then this is a case in which someone can help doing what she does even though her behavior is involuntary. Insofar, it will also be a case violating my account of voluntary behaviors as those that, at the time of their onset, we can prevent. Yet although it is intriguing, the case is not compelling. We are all familiar with occasions in which someone burps or lets some other bodily function have its way. The plea, ‘I couldn’t help it,’ is often disallowed; so too with, ‘It just slipped out!’ The difference between the normal adult and the crotchety great-aunt is that she can prevent her outbursts only if she pays all her attention to the task of doing so, while most of us can prevent a burp even while attending to other tasks. Because of this, and in lieu of a fuller description of Pink’s great-aunt, I would urge that at the time of its onset, since she is focusing some of her attention on the little boy, she cannot help making the remark she does. This accounts for why we don’t think of her outbursts as voluntary.

It also calls for a more detailed individuation of actions than I offer in the book. I need to be able to deny, of the aunt’s rude remark, that she could have refrained from making it while also attending to the child giving her flowers; at the same time I want to agree that she could have kept the rude remark to herself had she focused all her energy on doing so. A first step in an elaboration of a view admitting both possibilities would be a fuller account of the interaction of agency, time, and possibility. A framework for doing so is given in Belnap and Green 2001, in which, in the context of an indeterminist view of time, we explain how modal facts change with time’s passage. Thus at time t, it might be possible to prevent action a, while at t+n, relative to history h (which has been traversed due to an action being performed) it is no longer possible to do so. In future work I hope to provide an elaboration of this ap-
proach that will explain how such apparently innocuous phenomena as what we are paying attention to at a given moment can make a difference for what we are able to do at that time.

6. Expression and Handicaps

In the book I draw an analogy between certain speech acts, such as assertion, and handicaps, as that term is used in the evolutionary biology of communication (Maynard Smith and Harper 2004). According to this analogy, a speech act such as assertion puts a speaker at risk of a loss of credibility, and it is precisely this ‘sticking one’s neck out’ aspect of the act that enables it to convey knowledge. The analogy is mooted in the book, and is further developed in Green 2009 by means of the idea that one who performs a speech act having a sincerity condition is subject to a loss of credibility in case they perform that act without fulfilling that condition. Eriksson argues that being subject to a loss of credibility is not a necessary condition for expressing or showing one’s state of mind. His reason is that in a case in which two interlocutors are likely never to interact again after an initial encounter, one of them can nevertheless show or express her belief to the other. This, however, is no objection to my hypothesis that certain speech acts are handicaps. The reason is that the handicap hypothesis is aimed to explain how speech acts express psychological states; it is not meant as a general account of how we show or express them. Accordingly, it should be clear that I can show a belief simply by acting in a way whose best explanation is the presence of such a belief (I pull an umbrella and overcoat from the closest as I prepare to go outdoors; surely here I show my belief that bad weather is likely). Further, on my gloss of expression as a form of designed showing, it’s easy to see how in such a case I can also express my belief: I need only show the aforementioned belief intentionally, as I might do by overtly pulling umbrella and overcoat from the closet. Eriksson’s objection as it stands thus raises no difficulties for my position, but we do well to consider a more pressing challenge by asking whether it’s possible to make an assertion with no risk of loss of credibility. For instance, I might be asked directions in a crowded train station, and can evidently answer that question with an assertion in spite of the fact that the stranger and I will never meet again. How, then, could I be subject to a loss of credibility? The answer is that I can still be subject to such a loss even if the probability of losing my credibility is low: Even in the train station case, it is still true that were, e.g., the hapless tourist to encounter me in another part of the city, still no nearer his train,
he’d be right to question my credibility (Green 2009, p. 159). Being subject to a loss of something is a dispositional notion that is orthogonal to assessments of probability. Eriksson also argues that being subject to a loss of credibility is not sufficient for showing one’s belief. The reason is that one can be subject to such a loss without believing the proposition one asserts. In such cases, one cannot be showing one’s belief. However, in *Self-Expression* I do not contend that being subject to a loss of credibility is sufficient to show one’s belief. The most I contend is that in the context of a speech act, undertaking such liability is strong evidence of the existence of a belief whose content is the same as that of the speech act. That strong evidence suffices to show a belief only if there’s a belief there to be shown; otherwise it is the illocutionary analogue of an optical illusion.

7. Expressing By Showing-That

As mentioned above, I argue that some expressive behavior enables perception of the state expressed. By contrast, other expressive behavior enables knowledge that an expressing agent is in a certain state without, so far as I can tell, making that state perceptible. For instance, one who sincerely asserts P expresses her belief that P. I do not, however, wish to claim that a sincere assertion makes a belief perceptible, and more generally I do not wish to claim that the sorts of states that speech acts express are perceptible either to the producers or addressees of those speech acts. Rather, the adversion to the evolutionary biology of communication is supposed to help explain how speech acts make the psychological states they express knowable in spite of our apparent inability to perceive them.

Bar-On takes issue with this. Her concern seems to be that allowing any instance of self-expression to show the state it does in the showing-that way (rather than the showing-a or even showing-how-it-feels way), threatens to occlude what is distinctive of expressive as against other forms of communicative behavior. Bar-On finds it striking that

... having gone to some length to establish self-expression as special among the signaling behaviors of human and nonhuman animals in that expression involves the showing of mental states, Green goes on to include under the umbrella of showing relevant to expression not only showing-a and showing-how but also showing *that* one is in the mental state. In so doing, it seems to me that Green takes away some of what he gives us by portraying expressing as showing. (2010, pp. 216-7)
An intuition driving my account of what it is to express oneself is that in so doing one manifests part of oneself in a way that is absent when one merely describes oneself. One who coolly and clinically describes herself as angry does not manifest, and in general does not express, that anger. Bar-On’s concern seems to be that if we conceptualize, say, assertion as expressing belief in the showing-that way, then we will have lost sight of assertion’s ability to manifest our states of mind; so too with other speech acts.

Bar-On offers an example to sharpen the point, asking us to imagine a race of creatures programmed by nature in such a way that whenever they are in mental state M, they report themselves as being in that state. They are also incapable of dissimulation. Bar-On now asks, “Would the creatures’ compulsive self-reports be rendered any more instances of self-expression just in virtue of their unassailable reliability?” (2010, p. 217) My answer, however, to this question, should be clear: self-expression is a qualitative, not a quantitative notion, and so does not admit of degree. It makes no sense to speak of one act or behavior being more a case of self-expression than some other. Some acts might express more of an agent’s state of mind than do others, but this fact adds no force to Bar-On’s challenge.

Bar-On also challenges the account of how speech acts express the states they do in the showing-that way, by suggesting that this account opens up too large a space between the creature expressing itself the addressee of the expressive act. Bar-On writes:

As I see it, one main challenge for an account of expression that is intended to cover not just so-called natural expressions is to explain how this naïve idea can be extended to cover also expressive behavior that uses conventional vehicles, for example. From the observer point of view, the relevant contrast is between behavior that allows some kind of immediate recognition of the expressed state, as opposed to requiring, say, inference (however secure) from various features of the behavior supplemented by contextual information and background knowledge. Allowing that the showing relevant to expressing is (inter alia) showing that enables propositional knowledge seems to ignore this contrast. (2010, p. 218)

The objection is that if we conceptualize any instances of self-expression as manifesting what they do in the showing-that way, then doing so will prevent an appreciation of what is expressive of such cases because on such a conceptualization what is expressed will only be knowable through the route of some inference. However, the objection seems to be, the relation of the observer of the expressed state to the state itself should be more immediate and direct than such an inferential mediation would allow.
We may begin to see how this objection can be blunted by noting that ‘immediate recognition’ admits of two kinds. The immediacy might be of a phenomenological sort, so that the agent does not go through any conscious deliberation or calculation in arriving at a conclusion. An example would be discerning the meaning of a novel sentence on the basis of its meaningful components and their mode of composition. On the other hand, recognition might be immediate in that it does not involve ratiocinative processes, conscious or unconscious, such as when a person gives a startle response in the face of a fast-looming object. The agent in whom this “low road” to emotion is traversed carries out no inferences at either the conscious or unconscious level.

Some awareness of expressive behavior is very likely of the latter sort. Given the power of emotional contagion, and our exquisite sensitivity to what is happening on one another’s faces, it’s a fair bet that when I, for instance, observe a bawling infant my awareness of her emotional state is a great deal like my response to a looming object in that neither response involves conscious or unconscious inference. However, it seems implausible that I should perceive anyone’s beliefs no matter how sincerely they express them verbally, just as the phenomenological immediacy with which we understand one another’s words does not mandate taking literally any suggestion that we perceive meanings. That is, we can accept the considerations that inspire some authors to hold that in normal cases of communication we literally perceive one another’s meanings, without buying that extreme conclusion. Those considerations include such facts as that the process of grasping someone’s meaning has the phenomenological feel of being effortless and not under our control; and, likewise, it does not in general seem as if one is inferring a meaning from the meanings of the words one sees or hears. Yet as Smith (2009) rightly points out, we can acknowledge these considerations without accepting the conclusion that grasping someone’s meaning is literally an instance of perceptual experience.

So it is with our epistemic relation to another’s expressed state. While I would argue (and as adumbrated in II.4 above) that we can perceive emotions in some cases in which they are expressed by others, I do not find Bar-On’s considerations supporting the idea that we perceive beliefs as expressed by assertions to be forceful enough to justify giving up on our erstwhile intuition to the contrary. Instead, we may accept those considerations while holding that, as with grasping meaning, grasping an expressed belief is perception-like without being perceptual. It is perception-like in that it is not under our direct voluntary control, does not appear to the subject as if it requires
effort, and does not seem to the subject to be the result of an inferential process.\(^6\)

8. Expression and Aesthetics

In his insightful discussion focusing on the final chapter of the book, Moore raises five questions, each of which I discuss below.

A. Moore first raises a doubt as to whether what he terms qualitative expression is really distinct from showing-that and showing-\(\alpha\). I have stressed that very often a single event of experiencing a person express, say, anger, will be a complex mixture of all three: We may learn that she is angry, we may perceive her anger, and her way of expressing that anger may show us how it feels. Nevertheless, Moore writes, 'As I convey qualitative aspects of my exasperation, I seem simply to provide additional propositional knowledge about my experience—specifically, about the narrow category of which it's a member.' The suggestion is that when someone expresses her affective state, the most she can be doing is providing information about what state she is in. I argue in more detail elsewhere (Green 2008) that one can show that she is in a certain state without enabling anyone to know what that state feels like. This argument, together with Moore's suggestion, would imply that acts of self-expression never, per se, enable others to know how one feels.

A sufficiently capacious notion of proposition would require a more complex discussion than I can offer here. One might argue that knowledge-how reduces to knowledge-that because, for instance, knowing how to ride a bicycle can always be recast as knowing that one rides a bicycle like this—and here one demonstrates the method. If we count such ‘demonstrative’ propositions as propositions, then we might also hold that showing-how reduces to showing that (‘my anguish feels like this...’, etc.). I don't need to take sides on this issue; rather, it suffices to point out that even if we adopt the broader conception of a

\(^6\) In support of her tentative suggestion that perceiving beliefs is indeed possible, Bar-On suggests that perhaps what is perceived is not a state of believing but rather an act of expressing belief: “Wide-open eyes, an ear-to-ear smile, a long face, may be said to show the relevant emotions ‘all by themselves’. But insofar as what needs to be made perceptible is an occurrent episode (say, of feeling annoyed by something), we ought to think of the performances (qua events) as what does the work of enabling perception.” (2010, 225) I have little doubt that if beliefs were perceptible, assertions and related speech acts are what would make them available for perception. What I do not, however, understand, is how the antecedent of that conditional could be true. I should also note that in saying that I do not understand how it is possible to perceive such cognitive states as beliefs, I am not claiming that it is impossible to do so.
proposition, the issue will then become whether qualitative expression can be recast as showing-that in the narrower sense of that term. (For a further discussion of the relation between knowing how and knowing that, see Green 2010c.)

As I convey the quality of my exasperation, I most likely also provide propositional knowledge. However, I would resist Moore’s contention that this is all that I do. As background, I’m assuming that the qualitative nature of experience is not something that can be fully captured in propositional or other verbal terms: no amount of description, in the sense of pure semantic content, will convey what a red apple looks like to someone who has had no direct experience of redness. So too, insofar as an emotion has a qualitative dimension, that dimension is not one that will be conveyed by description alone. Consider Moore’s own attempt to express what his exasperation feels like after seeing a valuable gadget mauled by his child: the image he offers is of a swarm of mosquitoes on a humid day. Another’s appreciation of that description depends on their being able to draw on an experience of that kind or something near enough: the sound of the buzzing in one’s ears, the feel of the nagging itch after a sting, and the unpleasant and edgy feel of exasperation. Each of these has a qualitative dimension that cannot be fully captured by propositional content sensu semantic content.

Different points apply to the suggestion that showing-how can be reduced to showing-a. Moore’s description of his frustration may well provoke in me an analogous frustration to his own, thereby going beyond my merely bringing into consciousness what frustration feels like. However, contrary to what he contends, this will not result in my perceiving his frustration; instead it will enable me to feel frustration, or empathize with his, or both. More generally, my feeling the same emotion as you is not sufficient for my perceiving your emotion; the same goes for my feeling and introspecting on it. In fact, I can feel an emotion without perceiving anything external to myself at all; it follows that feeling an emotion is not sufficient for perceiving the emotion of another. Likewise, if I introspect on that emotion, I become aware of my own affective state rather than that of someone else.8

7 I add this qualification because descriptions can often themselves be expressive. Rhythmic, percussive, alliterative and other aspects of language can all be used to this effect. Restriction to ‘pure semantic content’ is intended to prise off this aspect of description.
8 I’ve argued that showing how an emotion or experience feels cannot be reduced either to showing-that or showing-a. This argument does not on its own imply that showing how an emotion or experience feels cannot be reduced to some combination of the two. However, that possibility seems sufficiently recherché that I feel justified in leaving its consideration for another occasion.
B. Moore also asks whether qualitative expression is a form of expression at all. In support of this challenge he mentions an example I use in *Self-Expression*, in which, in answer to a question about how I feel, I respond by pointing to a raging storm outside. Moore writes, ‘It’s true that something inner is externalized when I use these methods to give you knowledge of my experiences, but the externalizing seems less a matter of my ‘pressing out’ to you what is within than it is a matter of using description and experiential congruence to let you in.’ Moore is right to see that the relation between the external state of affairs that may in some sense correspond to the agent’s emotion, and that emotion, is tenuous: it was indeed not ‘pressed out’ of the agent, but was instead provided by the environment. This may just show, however, that the example was not ideal for my purposes. Let us thus modify it instead to be one in which I have the power to create weather—storm, wind, calm, rain as the case may be. If in answer to the question how I feel I now conjure up a hurricane-grade storm, this would be a better case in which I show how I feel. Contrary to what Moore may be tempted to say here, the agent is not describing how he feels. Further, it would be a case of ‘pressing out’ that enables others to understand how the agent feels. It also seems intuitively clear that it would be a case in which the agent shows how he feels.

C. Next, Moore asks whether our discriminatory capacities are sufficiently fine-grained and robust for the approach to do the explanatory work it needs to do. He asks, ‘Are my olfactory discriminations consistent enough to determine a personal quality space for smell?...[Likewise] I don’t think I can say whether the taste of tofu is more like blue or green.’ One way of thinking of a proposition is as a set of possible worlds. The proposition that pigs fly comprises all those worlds in which pigs fly, including those in which horses meow and those in which they don’t. That proposition is thus informationally vacuous on the question whether horses meow. So too, an experience occupies an area of ‘experiential space.’ Absent further specification, a bitter experience will include points in that space that are intense as well as those that are mild. It will exclude all those points incompatible with bitterness—presumably this will include at least those points that are sweet.9 Similarly, in these terms an experience of green will occupy a quite large swath of experiential space because green is neutral as between pleasant/unpleasant, and as between intense/mild. (Things might be different for a specific hue of green.) But the same goes for blue: like green, it is relatively neutral as between intense/mild and pleasant/unpleasant. From the point of view of affective space, then, we should think of experiences

9 Some experiences are of course bittersweet, but these are necessarily complex, containing both bitter and sweet aspects.
of blue and of green as informationally fairly impoverished, and in similar ways. Accordingly, regardless of your feelings about tofu, it’s not likely to be more like one of these color experiences than the other. Moore’s remark then, does not upset the explanatory apparatus I offer. In fact, intermodal congruences may be the exception rather than the norm for the vast array of experiences that fill our lives. Finally, keeping in mind that olfactory experiences are considerably more articulated in some people than in others, and vastly more articulated in some species than in others, we might wonder whether Moore’s are consistent enough to determine some kind of personal quality space for him. He does, I’m sure, find some odors pleasant and others unpleasant; some odors are likewise intense and others are mild (I doubt that odors vary among one another on the dimension of active/passive). Because of the deep intermingling of taste and smell, further, I suspect that such judgments as these help guide him in choosing what to eat.

D. Moore also questions whether intermodal congruences could be the result of cultural or other kinds of conditioning, without upsetting any of my explanation. The answer to this will be a qualified yes: I don’t need to deny that some of these connections can be set up by either culture or an individual’s experience. In those cases in which connections are set up this way, however, intermodal congruence will not do much to explain why some items of experience have the expressive, and thus emotional valence that they do. What matters is that a good portion of such congruences not be traceable to such ‘external’ causes, and we have reason for confidence here: Marks 1978, 1995, for instance, provides a wide range of evidence that many intermodal congruences are pan-cultural. This is good reason to suppose that they have a basis that goes beyond cultural or other forms of conditioning.

E. Moore asks whether the hypothesis I offer about intermodal congruence is capable of explaining the phenomenon of artifacts having the affective qualities that they appear to have. Perhaps it is instead just a re-statement of that phenomenon. A characteristic question of Chapter Seven, recall, is why it is that a diminished chord has the anguished sound that it does. My answer is that the experience of that chord has a location in an experiential three-space very close to that occupied by anguish. This answer goes beyond merely claiming that the diminished chord sounds the way anguish feels. I don’t disagree with this Langerian claim; rather I wish to give an account of what makes it true. Moore sees all this clearly, and now asks a question about the qualitative dimensions along which experiences are said by my theory to vary. Referring to what I term the Expression as Showing Theory (EST) of artistic expression, Moore writes, If the EST has provided a novel explanation
of musical expressiveness, then the qualitative congruences and the qualitative dimensions that situate them, need to be distinct from the type of perceived resemblances that Kivy struggles to establish. But if qualitative intensity, for example, piggy-backs on the type and level of behavioral activity that an intense experience typically brings about, then I’m not sure there’s been a theoretical advance (Moore 2010). Moore’s point is right on target. If the quality of an experience is always traced back to that experience’s connection with action, then it won’t be clear that my account has added to what was already available in the literature, particularly in the work of Kivy. However, on my approach the quality of an experience is not always thus traceable. The unpleasantness of bitter, for instance, is connected to action (or to dispositions thereto) but is not something that holds because of that connection. Instead, the ‘location’ of an experience in a certain three-dimensional space is explanatorily basic in the following sense: it’s intrinsic to the experience that it has the location that it does. Of course, this fact might in turn admit of explanation in neurological terms, but it won’t undercut the ‘basicness’ I’m appealing to here.

III. Looking Ahead

I hope to have shown how the most significant contentions of \textit{Self-Expression} withstand the scrutiny of the acute commentators who have generously offered their contributions on that work. Nevertheless, their comments have suggested lines of inquiry and development that I hope to pursue in future research. Here are some of the more significant ones:

A. Voluntary and involuntary are perhaps best thought of as extremes along a continuum of behavior. What factors place an action at one rather than another point on that continuum? I hope to investigate the interaction of agency with attentional focus, while placing action in a larger framework of branching time in which modality is temporally sensitive.

B. Intermodal congruence merits fuller investigation. I hope to develop the notion of a quality space in further detail, as well as use this structuralist conception of experience to explain both expressiveness and the limits of spectrum inversion.

C. An evolutionary perspective on expression and, more broadly, the origins of human and other forms of communication is potentially very rich, particularly as it is informed by evolutionary game theory. I have taken a next step in this line of inquiry with Dorit Bar-On (Bar-On and Green 2010; Green
ms), with whom I am now collaborating on further projects concerned with language evolution.

D. Empathy is crucially bound up with our ability to show others how our experiences feel, yet it deserves more attention than I’ve been able to devote to it in the volume under discussion here. I’ve attempted to describe in more detail the relation of empathy to artistic expression, as well as to our ability to learn from fiction, in Green (2008) and Green (2010b) respectively. More work remains to be done, however, on the ways in which engagement with literature enables readers to hone their empathetic skills. I am also developing an argument that knowledge-that reduces to knowledge-how, and if that argument can be made successful, it will provide grounds for elaboration of the kinds of know-how that are mobilized by our engagement with the arts.

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