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Content

STATE OF THE ART

SCIENCE AND HISTORY

INTERPRETATION, INTENTIONS AND PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES

David K. Henderson

Epistemic Rationality, Epistemic Motivation, and Interpretive Charity

abstract

On what has become the received view of the principle of charity, it is a fundamental methodological constraint on interpretation that we find peoples intentional states patterned in ways that are characterized by norms of rationality. This recommended use of normative principles of rationality to inform intentional description is epistemically unmotivated. To say that the received view lacks epistemic motivation is to say that to interpret as it recommends would be epistemically irresponsible ans, in important respects irrational. On the alternative that I recommend, descriptive psychological generalization are what properly inform interpretation. One can readily understand the epistemic motivations for so interpreting, for they are the familiar reasons for informing description with background descriptive information. No parallel motivations for the received view seems possible.

I. Overview

In part as the result of Davidson's influential writings, it is common to read that interpretative understanding is subject to a fundamental methodological constraint, the principle of charity in interpretation, according to which we must so interpret as to find people holding true and rational beliefs, so far as possible. Of course, we will find ourselves attributing isolated false beliefs and sporadic instances of irrationality. But, it is insisted, it is the indispensable mark of good interpretation that it keeps this to a very significant minimum. Accordingly we are supposedly a priori assured that people will turn out to be

Roger F. Gibson

Stich on Intentionality and Rationality

abstract

In chapter 2 of The Fragmentation of Reason, Stephen Stich argues that certain passages of Quine s Word and Object are the source of what he calls the conceptual argument. That argument claims there is a conceptual connection between intentionality and rationality: intentionality requires rationality. Stich rejects the idea that intentionality requires either perfect or fixed bridgehead rationality, but he concedes that it requires minimal rationality. After explaining Stich s position and a criticism of it offered by John Biro and Kirk Ludwig, I sketch an alternative to the conceptual argument. This alternative claims that rationality requires psychological plausibility and/or smoothness of communication, not rationality.

I. Introduction

In chapter 2 of *The Fragmentation of Reason*, Stephen Stich construes certain passages of Quine's *Word and Object* as establishing "that the intentional description of a person's mental states requires some degree of rationality."[1] The question that interests Stich is "*how much* rationality is required for intentional description."[2] He surveys three potential answers: (1) perfect rationality is required, (2) fixed bridgehead rationality is required, and (3) minimal rationality is required. Stich rejects 1 and 2, but accepts 3. However, he goes on to argue that 3 is both "Pickwickean and profoundly uninteresting."[3] He concludes that "neither the conceptual argument [that intentional description presupposes rationality] nor the 'limits' it imposes need be taken seriously by either empirical psychologists or epistemic reformers."[4]

In section II, I explain Stich's textual generation of the conceptual argument. In section III, I explain his arguments against (1) perfect rationality and (2) fixed bridgehead rationality, and his argument for (3) minimal rationality. In section IV, I outline an alternative to the conceptual argument.

Alfred R. Mele

Rational Intentions and the Toxin Puzzle

abstract

   Gregory Kavka s toxin puzzle has spawned a lively literature about the nature of intention and of rational intention in particular. This paper is largely a critique of a pair of recent responses to the puzzle that focus on the connection between rationally forming an intention to A *and rationally* A-*ing, one by David Gauthier and the other by Edward McClennen. It also critically assesses the two main morals Kavka takes reflection on the puzzle to support, morals about the nature of intention and the consequences of a divergence between   reasons for intending and reasons for acting.*

Gregory Kavka's toxin puzzle (1983) has spawned a lively literature. Although the primary thesis that Kavka motivates with the puzzle concerns the nature of intention in general, much subsequent discussion of his puzzle has focused on *rational* intentions in particular. Here I will follow suit.[1] I will evaluate a pair of recent proposals about the connection between rationally forming an intention to *A* and rationally *A*-ing, one by Edward McClennen and the other by David Gauthier.

   The bulk of Kavka's puzzle is as follows:

   You have just been approached by an eccentric billionaire who has offered you the following deal. He places before you a vial of toxin that, if you drink it, will make you painfully ill for a day, but will not threaten your life or have any lasting effects. . . . The billionaire will pay you one million dollars tomorrow morning if, at midnight tonight, you *intend* to drink the toxin tomorrow afternoon. He emphasizes that you need not drink the toxin to receive the money; in fact, the money will already be in your bank account hours before the time for drinking it arrives, if you succeed. . . . All you have to do is . . . intend at midnight tonight to drink the stuff tomorrow afternoon. You are perfectly free to change your mind after receiving the money and not drink the toxin. (The presence or

John Heil

The Propositional Attitudes

abstract

Traditionally conceived, rational action is action founded on reasons. Reasons involve the propositional attitudes   beliefs, desires, intentions, and the like. What are we to make of the propositional attitudes? One possibility, a possibility endorsed by Donald Davidson, is that an agent s possession of propositional attitudes is a matter of that agent s being interpretable in a particular way. Such a view accounts for the propositional content of the attitudes, but threatens to undercut their causal and explanatory roles. I examine Davidson s view and the suggestion that the explanatory value of appeals to propositional attitudes is best understood on analogy with measurement systems, and argue that, appearances to the contrary, this conception of the propositional attitudes can be reconciled with the idea that reasons are causes.

Recent philosophy of mind has been preoccupied with the propositional attitudes: beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, intentions, and the like, insofar as these are taken to have 'propositional content'. My having a belief is a matter of my taking up a particular sort of attitude toward a particular proposition.[1] I might harbor the same attitude toward different propositions, in which case I have different beliefs; or I might have different attidues toward the same proposition: I might believe, desire, hope, fear, or, if I am a rainmaker, intend that it will rain.

One notable feature of the propositional attitudes is their fine-grainedness or definiteness. My believing that Socrates is wise differs from my believing that the husband of Xantippi is wise, even though Socrates is the husband of Xantippi. My beliefs inherit this feature — 'intensionality' — from the propositions: the proposition that Socrates is wise differs from the proposition that the husband of Xantippi is wise.

How might we comprehend a connection between the propositional attitudes traditionally described, and our physical endowment? How might we do so in a way that enables us to see the capacity to take up attitudes toward

Volkmar Taube

Exemplifikatorische Darstellung: Zu den Grundlagen einer kognitiven Ästhetik

abstract

After having introduced Goodman s concept of exemplification I discuss his general argument that exemplification would be the best for comprehensible the expressive phenomena of art. But there will arise problems when making differences between features of works of art which are exemplified and which are not, and when reconstructing the variable forms of autoreflexive expressions. I try to demonstrate that Goodman s concept of exemplification therefore ist too limited: 1. Goodman doesn t take into account that the caracteristics of works such as colours, form etc. also can be interpreted as materials of artistic expressions. 2. He doesn t give any idea to solve the question what would make an exemplification work effectively. Therefore I suggest to reformulate the concept of exemplification.

Die Exemplifikation ist eine uns vertraute Form der Darstellung. Fragt uns ein ausländischer Besucher, welche Farbe eine deutsche Telefonzelle hat, können wir ihm eine sprachliche Beschreibung geben - oder ihm eine Telefonzelle *zeigen*. Wenn ich mich für die letztere Form der Mitteilung entscheide, weise ich einem Alltagsgegenstand eine *Symbolfunktion* zu: Die Telefonzelle wird zum *Beispiel* für die Farbe einer Klasse von Gegenständen und auf diese Weise zu einem *Mittel* einer *Darstellung.*

Nelson Goodman hat bekanntlich die These vertreten[1], daß die "Exemplifikation" genannte symbolische Beziehung eine zentrale Bedeutung für die Theorie der Künste hat. Er konnte dabei an den etablierten Sprachgebrauch anknüpfen, demzufolge auch Kunstwerke, die weder etwas beschreiben noch etwas abbilden, eine darstellende Funktion haben, nämlich etwas *ausdrücken* können. Goodmans Ausdruckstheorie, so fruchtbar sie im Ansatz ist, leistet aber bei der Rekonstruktion des künstlerischen Ausdrucks nicht das, was sie verspricht.

Im folgenden soll gezeigt werden, warum das so ist. Doch betrachten wir zuerst den alltäglichen Fall der Exemplifikation etwas näher.

NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY, RATIONALITY AND NORMATIVITY

Paul K. Moser and David Yandell

Against Naturalizing Rationality

abstract

Recent obituaries for traditional non-naturalistic approaches to rationality are not just premature but demonstrably self-defeating. One such prominent obituary appears in the writings of W. V. Quine, whose pessimism about traditional epistemology stems from his scientism, the view that the natural sciences have a monopoly on legitimate theoretical explanation. Quine also offers an obituary for the a priori constraints on rationality found in first philosophy , resting on his rejection of the pernicious mentalism of semantic theories of meaning. Quine s pronouncements of the death of traditional conceptions of rationality in epistemology and in the theory of meaning are, we contend, but misguided wishes for their death, wishes that face severe problems of self-defeat. In addition, Quine s naturalistic epistemology is subject to damaging skeptical worries, the force of which one cannot escape by ignoring them. A non-naturalistic approach to rationality is here to stay, whether friends of Quine s naturalism like it or not. Any sweeping claim that non-naturalistic accounts of rationality are dead will face insurmountable obstacles from unavoidable questions about its own rational justification. Such questions will keep non-naturalistic epistemology and first philosophy alive forever, or at least as long as philosophers endure.

An increasingly popular dogma among philosophers implies that any reputable field of inquiry must be continuous with the natural sciences. Many advocates of this dogma presume that in analyzing rationality, theorists must restrict their conceptual apparatus to that of the "naturalist" — the term now current for a scientistic materialist. This dogma has led some theorists to suppose that traditional metaphysics and epistemology are moribund, if not dead already.

Some recent influential obituaries for traditional non-naturalistic approaches to rationality are, we shall argue, not just premature but demonstrably self-

Harvey Siegel

Naturalism, Instrumental Rationality, and the Normatvity of Epistemology

abstract

   Advocates of naturalized epistemology who wish to secure epistemology's normativity want that normativity to be restricted to instrumental concerns, because these can be understood naturalistically. But epistemic normativity cannot be so limited; a categorical sort of normativity must be acknowledged. Naturalism can neither account for nor do away with this sort of normativity. Hence naturalism is at best a seriously incomplete and therefore inadequate meta-epistemological position.

Introduction

Epistemology has traditionally been conceived as a *normative* discipline, concerned to develop and articulate criteria governing the appropriateness of belief. Ideally, it informs us of the warrant or justification which candidate beliefs enjoy, and of the nature of warrant and justification themselves. That is, ideally epistemology helps us to determine which of our beliefs are justified and so worth believing (and why they are); in so far, it helps to determine what we should believe. A central concept of (normative) epistemology is that of *rationality*, since (roughly) we believe rationally just when our beliefs are warranted and so *worthy* of belief.

   A large and growing body of work suggests that epistemology should be *naturalized*: reconceived as an empirical discipline, and pursued in accordance with the principles, standards and techniques of natural science. One outstanding question this work raises is precisely that of the status of epistemology's supposed normativity. Can epistemology be naturalized in a way that fully preserves and accounts for that normativity? If not, should naturalism be adopted at the cost of the weakening of that normativity? These are the questions to be pursued in this paper.

Ralf Naumann

Internal Realism, Rationality and Dynamic Semantics

abstract

   Putnam s internal realism implies a form of conceptual relativity with respect to ontology. There can be different descriptions of the world which are based on distinct ontologies. It has been argued that this relativity forecloses any possibility of unifying our knowledge and can even lead to inconsistency. If this is true, internal realism should be abandoned because it is compatible with non-rational positions. We will argue that these objections can be dismissed if truth as idealized warranted assertibility is understood as stability of a belief state under new evidence. This view of truth is still compatible with the existence of distinct belief states expressing different views on the world. This understanding of the notion of truth is a consequence of interpreting both our cognitive activities and the notion of meaning dynamically. The meaning of a sentence is no longer given in terms of (static) truth conditions but as a relation between belief sets, that is, as a kind of information change potential.

One of the most prominent theses put forth by Putnam in recent years is the thesis of *internal realism*. Recently it has been characterized by Putnam in the following terms.

> The point of internal realism is not that there are perspectives that you cannot conjoin ... but that there is no privileged 'ontology' in terms of which reality is to be described. Even unified knowledge can have a plurality of forms (Putnam(94a), p.254).

   Let us first illustrate what is meant by different perspectives or descriptions of the world by means of an example. Suppose there is some kind of world with just three different objects; call them a, b and c. Object a is black, object b is white and object c is red. According to the description we have just given, the following sentence is true.

   (1)   There are exactly three objects.

   Let us call this perspective or theory *theory 1*. But now suppose the following is done. One not only counts the objects a, b and c but also their mereologi-

Axel Wüstehube

Noch einmal: Rationalität und Normativität

abstract

The ongoing discussion about a notion of pragmatic rationality has evolved in a variety of different approaches, mainly because every author tries to combine his genuine philosophical point of view with the interpretation of rationality . Nevertheless there is an agreement of sorts that rationality cannot proceed mereley descriptively but has also normative implications.

The paper investigates the proposals of Nicholas Rescher and Herbert Schnädelbach concerning the question of a normativity of rationality. Moreover it deals with the problem of unity of reason and its interconnectedness with the inherent normativity of rationality.

I.

Auch wenn in der aktuellen Rationalitätsdiskussion die unterschiedlichsten Standpunkte vertreten werden (je nach philosophischer, sozialwissenschaftlicher, ethnologisch/anthropologischer etc. Ausrichtung), so scheint doch eines gleichermaßen anerkannt zu sein: Eine Theorie der Rationalität kann nicht rein deskriptiv verfahren, sie muß auch die immanente Normativität der Rationalität berücksichtigen. - Ein bekanntes Beispiel ist *Habermas* Begriff der "kommunikativen Rationalität", die von vornherein normativ konzipiert ist, insofern mit ihrer Hilfe "quasi-transzendentale" Diskurspräsuppositionen thematisiert werden sollen. Nicht so sehr das "Haben von Wissen" sei kennzeichnend für Rationalität, als vielmehr die Art und Weise, wie Subjekte Wissen erwerben und verwenden. Der "intuitiv verfügbare" Begriff der *Verständigungsrationalität* appelliere "an die Erfahrung der zwanglos einigenden, konsensstiftenden Kraft der argumentativen Rede, in der die Beteiligten ihre bloß subjektiven Auffassungen in Richtung auf vernünftig motivierte Überzeugungen und geteilte Einsichten überwinden - um sich in dieser

RATIONAL EXPLANATION, REASONING AND JUSTIFICATION

Philip Pettit

Three Aspects of Rational Explanation[1]

abstract

Rational explanation, as I understand it here, is the sort of explanation we practise when we try to make intentional sense of a person s attitudes and actions. We may postulate various obstacles to rationality in the course of offering such explanations but the point of the exercise is generally to present the individual as a more or less rational subject: as a subject who, within the constraints of the obstacles postulated - and they can be quite severe - displays a rational pattern of attitude - formation and decision-making.

In this paper I want to draw attention to three distinct, and progressively more specific, aspects of such rational explanation. I do so, because I believe that they are not always prised apart sufficiently. The first aspect of rational explanation is that it is a programming variety of explanation, in a phrase that Frank Jackson and I introduced some years ago (Jackson and Pettit 1988). The second is, in another neologism (Pettit 1986), that it is a normalising kind of explanation. And the third is that it is a variety of interpretation: if you like, it is a hermeneutic form of explanation.

1. Rational explanation as programming explanation

Rational explanation of action involves the attempt to explain an agent's speech or behaviour by reference to distinctive psychological states: roughly, by reference to states that reflect the information to which the agent gives countenance and the inclination that moves him; by reference, as the stock

Keith Lehrer

Rationality and Trustworthiness

abstract

Our rationality depends on the reasons we have for accepting and preferring what we do. But where do reasons come from? What makes what I accept a reason for a conclusion or what I prefer a reason for action? We can explain where reasons come from without postulation or regress. The explanation rests on our trustworthiness combined with our acceptance of it and our preference for it. The explanation reveals that theoretical and practical reason are intertwined in a loop of trustworthiness in what we accept, what we prefer and how we reason. The loop is the keystone of our rationality.

Our rationality depends on the reasons we have for accepting and preferring what we do. But where do reasons come from? Let me put that another way. What makes what I accept a reason for a conclusion or what I prefer a reason for action? Some philosophers are inclined to say that some things that I accept *just are* reasons for conclusions and some things that I prefer *just are* reasons for action, and that is all that you can say about it. These things are a kind of surd of reason. You cannot explain why they are reasons; they just are. It might appear that the surd of reason is inescapable or we will fall into a regress of explanation and justification. But we can escape the surd of reason. We can explain where reasons come from without the surd of reason or the absurd of regress. The explanation rests on our acceptance of our trustworthiness and our preference for it. Our quest for the explanation will reveal that theoretical and practical reason are intertwined in a referential loop which is the keystone loop of rationality.

The first step to answering our question involves the recognition of metamental ascent beyond the first level of belief and desire to the next level of acceptance and preference. Beliefs and desires often arise in us without reflection and sometimes contrary to our interests. We have, however, the capacity to evaluate our first order beliefs and desires and, in this way, rise

Alexander Ulfig

Stufen der Rechtfertigung

abstract

*For the last 30 years there have been debates in philosophy about the concept of rationality. In anglo-american circles they have been primary characterized as discussions about justified beliefs. By contrast, the debate in Germany among discourse-theorists (Habermas, Apel) has been linked to the problem of justification of communicative speech-acts (within the concept of the entire communicative situation). Herbert Schnädelbach has modified the discours-theoretical account. His concept can be regarded along a number of dimensions. He has developed a linguistic analysis of the validity claims made in various speech-act situations (following Paul Taylor). In Schnädelbach s view, normative characterizations of speech acts can be used descriptively, too. Furthermore, the hierarchy of justifications ends on the level of **rational choice**.*

My starting point here is: there is a fundamental distinction between justifications in everyday-life and a theoretical level of justification (discursive justifications). Thus, I discuss the hierarchy of justifications developed by Schnädelbach.

*Furthermore, I evaluate Schnädelbach s concept in a **semantic** perspective. I will show that Schnädelbach s pragmatical account requires a semantic analysis. Without recourse to such analysis, we cannot understand the universe of normative language.*

In den letzten 30 Jahren gibt es in der Philosophie Debatten über Rationalität, die im angelsächsischen Bereich als Diskussionen über "justified beliefs" charakterisiert werden können. Der Rationalitätsbegriff wurde hier weitgehend *epistemologisch* bestimmt. In der diskurstheoretischen Debatte in Deutschland (Habermas, Apel) wird die Explikation der Rationalität hingegen an die Rechtfertigungsproblematik von kommunikativen Sprechhandlungen gebunden. Herbert Schnädelbach hat 1977 die Arbeit "Reflexion und Diskurs" veröffentlicht, in der er den diskurstheoretischen Ansatz in wesentlichen Punkten fortentwickelt hat und auf die sich seine späteren Überlegungen zum Begriff der Rationalität zum Teil stützen. Die Schnädelbachsche Konzeption des *normativen Diskurses* liefert eine linguistische Analyse der Geltungsansprüche von Sprechhandlungen. Eine weitere These von Schnädelbach besagt, daß auch von *normativen* Charakterisierungen ein *deskriptiver* Gebrauch

CONCEPTS OF PRACTICAL RATIONALITY

Peter French

Rationality and Ethics

abstract

   The Why be moral? problem has been one of the more persistent problems of ethics. The problem is typically posed as a conflict between what is straightforwardly maximal for a person to do in specific circumstances and what is recommended by the principles or rules of ethics, usually what is communally optimal, in those circumstances. Typically ethicists try to convince us that both collectively and individually we will be better off in the long run if we each adopt cooperative strategies despite *the temptations of immediate profit offered by straightforward maximization policies. After reworking the notion of straightforward maximizer such that it makes sense to say that I may sometimes have rationally good reasons to perform actions that do not in the circumstances, taken individually, maximize my utility just so long as the best-for-me accessible-to-me possible world is realized, I am able to show why it is the case that in social interactions that mirror iterated Prisoner s Dilemmas the constraints of ethics on straighforward maximization are redundant. The policy of straighforward maximization that I defend is more flexible that one of cooperation. It reaps the benefits of cooperation when they are to be had and avoids the disasters of cooperation that lurk in every meeting one has with potentially treacherous strangers. Where the policy of straightforward maximization departs from the ethical choice, I argue, it does so because making that choice would be scrificial, supererogatory, even from the moral point of view. Acting ethically by constraining one s straighforward maximinzation therefore cannot be rationally justified.*

1. One of the more persistent problems of ethics has been the one framed by the question "Why be moral?". The problem is typically posed as a conflict between what is straightforwardly maximal for a person to do in specific

Pierre Kerszberg

Feeling and Coercion: Kant and the Deduction of Right

abstract

Even though the concept of right is not empirical, Kant does not deduce right in a transcendental manner. If, in conformity with the rational principles of transcendental philosophy, we try to understand why this is so, the answer may be found in an analogy with aesthetic reflection. Indeed, aesthetic reflection might contain the transcendental ground of violence in civil society.

Kant's concept of right essentially consists in the law of external freedom, which defines a symmetrical order of coexistence for human beings living according to the spatial relations proper to each society.

The law not only delimits the domain which one may reasonably consider one's own and occupy as one sees fit, but it also authorizes one to defend one's domain against encroachments and attacks from without. Indeed, according to Kant, right is *analytically* linked with the authorization of coercion: "there is connected with Right by the principle of contradiction an authorization to coerce someone who infringes upon it."[1] The authorization of constraint is thus the expression of one's permission to defend domains of freedom which are universally compatible with one another.[2] But we may nonetheless ask why Kant does not go on to deduce right, why right, though its concept is not empirical, does not in its universal principle admit of a transcendental demonstration, which would make it a necessary representation.[3] The answer may be found in an analogy; it seems that an absolute distinction between the principle of right and the categorical imperative cannot be drawn, since both contain criteria of universalization that reason draws from itself. In both cases, the other is only postulated; I cannot represent the other's freedom to myself. Each of the deductions of juridical concepts (possession, acquisition, occupation) is an analytic proof, while the juridical propositions to which these concepts contribute are synthetic because, a priori, "practical reason *extends*

Raymond Boudon

Une éthique est-elle possible en l absence de croyances dogmatiques?

abstract

A recurrent topic among philosophers as well as social scientists since Novalis, Comte, Weber, modern existentialists, and post-modern sociologists, etc. is that in the absence of what Tocqueville called dogmatic beliefs values cannot be grounded : you prefer liberty, I prefer equality; none of us would be neither right nor wrong. Contemporary writers as Rawls and Habermas defend, against this current view, the idea that value statements can be grounded rationally. Habermas theory of communicational rationality remains procedural, formal and on the whole mysterious, however: how can this peculiar type of rationality be definied and made analytical ? A cognitive theory of axiological rationality is developed here starting from the basic point that normative statements and axiological beliefs should be analyzed as grounded on reasons with a transsubjective validity, as positive statements are. This theory is checked in a tentative fashion against some examples of axiological beliefs from ordinary experience and against a few pieces of data drawn from experimental social psychology.

Une obsession

Le "désenchantement" a-t-il ruiné les valeurs? Sommes-nous devenus incapables d'endosser un jugement de valeur avec confiance? L'axiologique est-il devenu une affaire d'opinion ? Cette inquiétude est depuis longtemps omniprésente dans les sciences sociales et ailleurs. Dans "La Chrétienté ou l'Europe", Novalis regrette que nous ne vivions plus "dans l'ère belle et heureuse où l'Europe était unie par une croyance universellement partagée". A. Comte partage la même inquiétude. Le thème est repris de manière positive par ce disciple si proche du maître que fut Durkheim : sur quelles bases asseoir une morale laïque? Chez Max Weber, le "désenchantement" se conjugue avec le "polythéisme des valeurs", mais laisse subsister la "rationalité axiologique". Dans ce concert, Tocqueville est peut-être -comme souvent- le plus nuancé et le plus perspicace. La ruine des "croyances dogmatiques", irréversible selon lui, est grosse d'une

RaimoTuomela

Rational Cooperation and Collective Goals

abstract

It is argued that full-blown cooperation needs collective goals in a strong sense satisfying the "Collectivity Condition". According to this condition, a collective goal ist of the kind that necessarily, due of the goal-holders acceptance of the goal as their collective goal, if it is satisfied for one of the goal-holders it is satisfied for all the others. Not only collective goals but also other group-factors (such as possibly institutional "group-mode" preferences and utilities) are argued to be relevant to rational cooperative solutions of collective action dilemmas.

I Introducing Rational Cooperative Action

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the notion of rational cooperation and particularly under what conditions it is rational to cooperate. In part the discussion will make use of game-theoretical notions and results, but with an emphasis on conceptual rather than technical issues. I will take cooperation in its full sense to be collective activity requiring the shared pursuit of a *collective goal*. "Quasi-cooperation", however, is a weaker notion of cooperation that only requires action towards *shared personal goals* (which fall short of constituting a collective goal). Quasi-cooperation is the kind of cooperation that is typically meant when cooperation and defection in the context of collective action dilemmas (such as exemplified by the Prisoner's Dilemma situation) are considered. Cooperation can concern both single-agent actions and collective (as well as joint) actions. The main new idea or point in this paper is the elaboration of the idea that one's reasons for cooperative action can be either "merely personal" (or "individual", but still possibly highly social) or "collective" (or "group-related"). Collective reasons are relevant to attempts to resolve the conflict between *individual rationality* and *collective rationality* involved in collective action dilemmas.

Wolfgang Welsch

Vernunft heute

abstract

What type of reason will work under the present conditions? To answer this question a meaningful conception of reason (as distinct from rationality) has to be developed, and is contemporary conditions (due to change in the field of rationality) have to be specified.

In part I. of the paper, the radically altered structure of rationality is analysed; it turns out to be characterized by rational disorder. Part II. offers a redefinition of reason; guided by the idea of justice reason operates in transition from one rationality to another. This new kind of reason - transversal reason - is further elaborated in part III. It is regarded as a key-element of any type of reason.

Vorbemerkung

Unter dem Titel "Vernunft heute" behandle ich nicht die zeitgenössische Vernunftkritik und deren Varianten, sondern die Frage, wie Vernunft heute möglich und geboten sein könnte. Im Unterschied zur Radikalkritik an Vernunft will ich es mit Wittgensteins Satz halten: "Das Philosophieren mag zwar vielleicht bedeuten, daß man sein Temperament preisgibt, niemals jedoch die Vernunft".[1] Gegenüber der allzu simplen Berufung auf Vernunft hingegen erinnere ich an Adornos Warnung, "daß es gerade an der Stelle, an der die Berufung auf Vernunft am promptesten eintritt, unweigerlich um die Apologie der Unvernunft geht".[2] Vernunft welcher Art, so will ich fragen, vermag - jenseits von Vernunftdefaitismus und Vernunftdogmatismus - unter heutigen Bedingungen tragfähig zu sein?

Um diese Frage beantworten zu können, muß ich erstens einen gehaltvollen Begriff von Vernunft explizieren. Weder darf, wie weithin üblich, nur von Rationalität die Rede sein, noch darf selbst dort, wo von Vernunft gesprochen wird, doch bloß Rationalität gemeint sein. Es braucht einen von Rationalität