From Multiple Modernities to Multiple Globalizations

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Abstract
We draw from Eisenstadt’s (2002) conceptualization of multiple modernities which he proposed to analyze processes marking modernity and their different versions in contemporary societies. These processes do not delete all pre-existing orientations, value affinities and social arrangements, and while modernity is recognizable everywhere, modern societies also differ at other respects. We formulate a similar contention for globalization. We point to three interacting and intermingling movers of social reality – globalization, multiculturalism and the national principle – which concretize everywhere, and according to contexts and a priori features, specific models qualifying for the notion of multiple globalizations. Beyond the variety of multiple globalizations, this notion underlines the newness of our time and hints the “next society”.

S.N. Eisenstadt’s conceptualization

S.N. Eisenstadt passed away on September 2nd, 2010, in Jerusalem. His disappearance left a great void in the global community of social scientists. His ideas on the plurality of both the origins and the outcomes of trajectories of modernity in the world attracted the attention of social scientists. His contentions began with a strong argument against the linear teleological narrative of modernization, which equates it with Westernization: he pleaded for the recognition of the symbolic and institutional variability of modernity. Any study of modernity, he contended, must acknowledge its multiple potential paths and patterns and that it may also include violent and repressive sequences.

Reflecting on Jaspers (1953), Eisenstadt saw a major breakthrough in human history in the crystallization of Axial Age civilizations and the emergence of new ontological conceptions of transcendental and mundane orders bearing potential for further transformations. One such transformation – the most dramatic – was the growth of modernity that entered the world, in many cases, through spectacular revolutions. Eisenstadt was convinced that new types of elites were the source of Axial transformations and further changes. In his mind, social change is not bound exclusively to conflict. Change may also be tied
to the building of social cohesion by the actions of elites. Eisenstadt, indeed, contended that the autonomy of social actors vis-à-vis their connection to society achieves a peak in modernity at which stage people experience a new qualitative relation of reflexivity to their acts and goals. Modernity, Eisenstadt argued, opens the way to new understandings, behaviors and conflicts.

A recurring theme in Eisenstadt’s study is his emphasis on endemic factors of change – in-built tensions, contradictions, conflicts and antinomies – accounting for alterations in, and transformations of, the social reality (Eisenstadt 1965). Eisenstadt applied this dialectical principle to his analyses of the dynamics of civilizations.

Eisenstadt’s (2000; 2001) perception of macro socio-historical transformations was neither evolutionist nor cyclical. Although he delineated vast periodic stages, his approach was also clearly distinguishable from any linear evolutionism in the vein proposed by Rostow (1960). Social changes, Eisenstadt said, are not unavoidable but they eventually lead to differentiations between institutional spheres and between societies. Given transformations that, at first glance, might be thought of as “similar stages” of development may turn toward divergent directions (Eisenstadt 2003). Eisenstadt insisted on the diversity that both Axial civilizations and patterns of modernity may adopt, conjunctively with their common characteristics. In brief, he called attention to potential convergences as well as divergences of social development and he definitely opposed any teleological evolutionism.

This outlook leads also to view the emergence and growth of modernity as a kind of unfolding program (see also Boudon 1990; 2007). This latter notion implies that the dynamics of the social order is anchored in key characteristics, including tensions and antinomies, that trace out paths of developments that cannot be known beforehand since they remain at all steps open to variance and alternates – unlike Marxism, for instance, that gives overwhelming weight to the relations of production (Plekhanov 1956) or the ‘technologist-productionist’ model that focuses on sources of livelihood (Kerr et al. 1962). On the other hand, the notion of postmodernity as a new era is, by its very formulation and in comparison to Eisenstadt’s approach, of little substantial content and the same applies to the concept of ‘late modernity’ (Giddens 1991).

In rejecting a ‘one-prime-mover’ causation of macro-social transformations, Eisenstadt came close to Max Weber’s (1977) opposition to any determinism; his start assumption of numerous possible trajectories of modernity was to be elaborated under the heading of multiple modernities. This concept reformulates and widens Weber’s (1994) assessment about the potential variance.
of modern societies which may differ from each other by their legal systems and institutions.

This open conceptualization of multiple modernities enables to avoid the theoretical stalemate of other approaches elaborating on narrow and unidirectional notions of modernity. Moreover, echoing Habermas (1989) who challenges postmodernism as offering a totalizing confusing perspective of contemporary society, Eisenstadt criticizes Foucault (see Rabinow 1984) who tends, according to him, to emphasize repressive aspects almost exclusively.

These considerations constitute not less than a breakthrough in the understanding of modernity, but one may also point out to a number of problems attached to the concept of multiple modernities as a tool for understanding and describing contemporary social realities. The view of present-day societies as modern is charted in a wide scope that emphasizes a multiplicity of concretizations, and this very openness may also constitute a weaknesses. It is indeed exposed to the difficulty to formulate consequent assessments by its inability to set forth the conditions whose fulfilment would signal the end of the age it designates. It is much easier to indicate the requirements whose realization would mark the end of the capitalist era – i.e. the appearance of a new class structure –, or of the industrial era – i.e. a radical transformation in technology causing non-industrial activities to gain in prevalence – than in the case of the multiple modernities model. This notion, under this angle, can be seen as unrestrained in time ever since modernity has appeared – an endless project ‘installed’ for good.

What one unveils here is that Eisenstadt’s use of a dialectic approach to social change remains partial. In a general manner, dialectic analysis, indeed, assumes that an innovative type of phenomena would emerge from within existing systems as a result of ultimate developments of basic contradictions which, from their very inception, herald a new era to come. Eisenstadt, as for him, does not indicate anything in the present-day social world that might, in potential, negate and transcend the notion of multiple modernities, let alone modernity. Under this angle, the project of multiple modernities shares a feature that one finds as well in ‘the end of history’ theme à la Fukuyama (1992). Modernity is not only “on endless trial” as Eisenstadt cites Kolakowski (1990), but also “on an endless trail”.

It is our own contention that three major societal movers that Eisenstadt was very well aware of but which he did not elaborate on from this perspective, play crucial transformative roles in the metamorphosis of our multiple-modernities era. They consist of globalization, multiculturalism and the national principle. Neither of these phenomena are new and originate from the present-day reality.
Though, the roles they come to play in contemporary societies seem to us to draw these societies into new circumstances and to carry impacts which hardly fit in the multiple-modernities standpoint.

Globalization

Contemporary societies, we may enounce, are hubs of multivariate activities originating from most diverse origins on the surface of the globe (World Economic Forum 2018). These activities are signaled in rich linguistic landscapes comprehending not just names of streets and roads, or signboards of institutions. As shown by researchers of language (Coulmas 2003; Chiswick and Miller 2002), these linguistic signs interact with the economy and print themselves in commercial developments. The backdrop to those phenomena consists of the expanding global economic system grounded in international financial and industrial webs controlling immense varieties of amenities (Sassen 1998).

Arnason (2002), James and Steger (2014) and many others see in world-cities the illustrations and concretizations of globalization, i.e. worldwide interconnectedness of actors, organizations, institutions, and enterprises (see also Lechner and Boli 2012). These settings are given shape by powerful actors who variously impact on social realities according to places and circumstances. Among these actors, the principal ones are multinational corporations and a multitude of businesses as well as world embracing bureaucracies. Other players do not principally or directly operate financial or material assets but still contribute to worldwide interconnectedness. We think of cultural agencies, artistic fashions or professional international scenes (Friedmann 2000).

Specialized agencies have calculated indexes of globalization to assert the relative global importance of world-cities and, on this basis, of their respective countries. Among others, the Globalization and World Cities Research Network (GaWC) created by Taylor (2004) which was joined by the Global Cities Index and Emerging Cities Outlook and the Global Power City Index (see definitions below).

On the basis of their findings, Foreign Policy published in 2009 a ranking of global cities which are the engines of growth for their countries and in the world more generally. In 2015, there were 35 megacities, with populations of ten million or more. The largest are Greater Tokyo and Shanghai with 38.8 million and 35.5 million, respectively. This demographic-urban concentration is relatively recent. In 1800, only 3% of the world’s inhabitants lived in cities, but
by the end of the twentieth century the figure was 47%. In 1950, there were 83 cities with populations exceeding one million; by 2007, that number had risen to 468 (UN 2013). This notion of world-city refers to cities which offer new forms of organization of capital, manpower, services and production. Though, the outstanding economic power of some actors goes together with – some say, on the shoulders of – contingents of low-waged and low-skilled workers (Knox & Taylor 1995). From the Global Cities Index and Emerging Cities Outlook (http://w.w.w.Lboro.ac.uk/gawc/), we learn:

The Global Cities Index and Emerging Cities outlook, is published by A. T. Kearney, an American global management. It maintains offices in 40 countries. Its fundamental assumption is that cities are ecosystems for businesses and innovation. It’s index is elaborated, on the basis of factors which contribute to business environments. It has been collecting data for the world’s most important cities since 2008. The 2017 Global Cities report, the seventh edition, testifies to the continued strength of many of the world’s largest cities. The GPCI Index uses figures and charts to introduce a city’s power through the lens of 6 functions (Economy, R&D, Cultural Interaction, Livability, Environment, Accessibility) covered in the Function-Specific Ranking, as well as through the viewpoint of urban actors. This work is published by the Mori Memorial Foundation. (Source: http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/)

Contemporary progress of globalization can be seen as a function of both the rise of new social forces and given constellations in many societies, and the growth of communication technologies, means of transport, and media. These changes and advancements have drastically increased worldwide interconnectedness. Globalization has become a most used notion that, in many people’s minds refers chiefly to the transnational expansion of networks and the proliferation of characteristic institutional structures (Albrow and King, eds, 1990). This globalization evinces the today’s permeability of national borders pushed by interested transnational and international actors.

Some scholars identify in these processes the march of progress (Friedman 2000), and Robertson (1992; 2002) speaks of people’s growing consciousness that they are part of a global entity whose aspirations transcend direct environments. Other researchers deplore what they understand as the weakening of national cultural and political autonomy, and see in globalization an era of growing incoherence of the social world and of hybridization of cultures – nay even of de-culturation (Urry 2002; 2005). Here and there, utopian thinking about an
ideal borderless world (Ohmae 1999/2005) finds new voices of endorsement.

More than a few scholars take a midway position by proposing the notion of glocalization to point out to the interactions between globalization and local processes. As Ritzer (2000) contends, despite the degree of uniformity which settings may share, unique configurations emerge from these developments in different places. The notion of hybridization (Nederveen Pieterse 2015) indicates the reciprocity of influences and interpenetrations of international, national, and ethnic cultures and languages. In quite a similar vein, Appadurai (1990) and Berger (2002) speak of cultural metamorphoses generated by these interactions in various domains that, as a whole, herald a new era (Albrow 1997). Globalization, adds Beck (2002), is a non-linear, dialectic process leading to a cosmopolitanization commanding new approaches to discourses and practices. In brief, a new global system of multifaceted exchange is coming out from worldwide interconnectedness. It enables ways of life unknown to previous generations – despite the fact that millions are still living, in the very same world-city, let alone in peripheries –, in shanty quarters and run-down homes.

Hence technology has been a major driver of globalization and it has transformed what economy means. One development brought about by globalization that is of special interest is the expansion of an omnipresent lingua franca, English – whose spread throughout the world is unprecedented. English, as documented by the Oxford Dictionary, serves as a major worldwide means of globalization and it signals that national economies have become wide-open internationally to communication between actors who share different mother languages. English is today an official language in about 60 countries on all continents (Crystal 2006) and the language most studied as a second language in non-English speaking countries. Numerous people in the vast majority of countries learn English, in some form. Many international, regional, and national organizations opt for English as their working language.

Walking through the streets of today’s downtowns of world-cities reveals that importance of English in the consumerist culture of the epoch. Jointly with this lingua franca, one also finds that other popular category of symbols of globalization consisting of tokens that belong to no regular language, have no grammar nor semantics, and comprise just names or icons. These tokens are well-known to passers-by as they designated goods and businesses found in a multitude of places. We call them BCNs – for Big Commercial Names; they are a sort of new language asserting, in their own manner, today typical consumerism. Because BCNs are syntaxless, they belong to that category of tokens that Jackendoff and Wittenberg (2014) describe as “what can be said without syntax.” For this very reason, some linguistic-landscape researchers
like Edelman (2009) exclude such items from linguistic-landscape analysis, or consider that they carry no linguistic value (Tufti and Blackwood 2010). In our own view, these tokens can be seen from a Durkheimian perspective as social facts, whose importance resides in their attachments to globalization and their expressing its contribution to the structuration of the public space. They may be drawn from a given language or radiate a flavor linking them to it but, on their own, they do not say anything pertinent about what they stand for. BCNs constitute in this the best illustration of what Goffman meant by the principle of presentation-of-self (Goffman 1963), since they target exclusively how the environment perceives them (Abrams and Hogg 1990 for a review).

Though, this latter argument tackles only one aspect of globalization. Other debates involve more comprehensive understandings of our era. Proponents of globalization and globalized consumerism argue that globalization warrant progress and improvement in the standard of living of our world, while opponents claim that the creation of an unfettered international free market benefits multinational corporations in the Western world at the expense of local enterprises, local cultures, and the common people beyond the West.

Eisenstadt himself saw globalization as a prolongation of the development of societies along the lines of the multiple-modernities paradigm. What is to add to this assessment is that some major aspects and implications of globalization move society beyond what modernity, in any form, assesses. We think, for instance, of phenomena such as interconnectedness transgressing national borders more or less free from state control, the emergence of blocks of nations where national sovereignty compromises with wider commitments, the worldwide echo of—reactions to and intervention in—events taking place anywhere on the surface of the globe, the formation of transnational diasporas and the like. In brief, contemporary social entities, nay even individuals, are more than ever influenced in their perspectives, interests and habitus by factors that are not strictly local or national. These factors belong to modernity but their globalized dimension endorse them a significance—practical and conceptual—that goes beyond what was forecast by the multiple-modernities paradigm. A dimension that challenges the limits of local societal settings.
Table 1: Transnational migrations in the world: Selected years 1990-2017

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WORLD</td>
<td>152,542,3</td>
<td>172,604,2</td>
<td>190,531,6</td>
<td>220,019,2</td>
<td>247,585,7</td>
<td>257,715,42</td>
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<tr>
<td>More developed reg</td>
<td>7382,391,61</td>
<td>57103,417,8</td>
<td>66130,683,5</td>
<td>44140,250,1</td>
<td>5145,983,83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less developed reg</td>
<td>970,150,75</td>
<td>9469,186,36</td>
<td>1789,335,74</td>
<td>97107,335,5</td>
<td>111,731,59</td>
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<tr>
<td>High-income count</td>
<td>475,239,01</td>
<td>3100,404,8</td>
<td>5117,786,0</td>
<td>9141,789,0</td>
<td>47156,816,8</td>
<td>5164,846,88</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle-income count</td>
<td>068,475,18</td>
<td>1164,042,29</td>
<td>5664,661,46</td>
<td>4970,204,76</td>
<td>9779,772,83</td>
<td>781,439,828</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low-income countries</td>
<td>18,533,974</td>
<td>07,732,750</td>
<td>17,604,325</td>
<td>27,545,206</td>
<td>610,491,45</td>
<td>10,914,651</td>
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<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>14,690,31</td>
<td>13,716,53</td>
<td>14,272,36</td>
<td>15,691,99</td>
<td>621,705,23</td>
<td>22,975,988</td>
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<td>AFRICA</td>
<td>915,690,62</td>
<td>914,800,30</td>
<td>115,462,30</td>
<td>917,007,24</td>
<td>423,436,08</td>
<td>24,650,223</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eastern Africa</td>
<td>35,964,031</td>
<td>64,844,795</td>
<td>64,745,792</td>
<td>94,657,063</td>
<td>86,920,965</td>
<td>7,591,799</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>1,460,530</td>
<td>1,756,687</td>
<td>1,928,828</td>
<td>2,139,979</td>
<td>3,436,978</td>
<td>3,539,697</td>
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<tr>
<td>Northern Africa</td>
<td>2,403,200</td>
<td>1,885,650</td>
<td>1,731,939</td>
<td>1,893,613</td>
<td>2,354,732</td>
<td>2,410,0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>1,392,359</td>
<td>1,222,314</td>
<td>1,439,426</td>
<td>2,357,093</td>
<td>4,112,793</td>
<td>564,338,205</td>
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<td>Western Africa</td>
<td>4,470,503</td>
<td>5,090,860</td>
<td>5,616,321</td>
<td>5,959,501</td>
<td>6,610,620</td>
<td>6,770,466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>16,630,683</td>
<td>25,183,872</td>
<td>05,238,699</td>
<td>85,262,414</td>
<td>25,393,504</td>
<td>5,462,972</td>
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</table>
Table 1 (cont.): Transnational migrations in the world: Selected years 1990-2017

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Asia</td>
<td>3,959,345</td>
<td>5,393,081</td>
<td>6,229,524</td>
<td>7,061,814</td>
<td>7,600,768</td>
<td>7,776,716</td>
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<td>Southern Asia</td>
<td>19,436,34</td>
<td>15,278,02</td>
<td>13,722,01</td>
<td>14,307,64</td>
<td>14,173,83</td>
<td>13,582,40</td>
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<td>South-Eastern Asia</td>
<td>32,876,616</td>
<td>40,926,833</td>
<td>16,522,343</td>
<td>68,673,693</td>
<td>69,609,923</td>
<td>9,873,600</td>
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<tr>
<td>Western Asia</td>
<td>15,205,44</td>
<td>18,416,52</td>
<td>21,531,15</td>
<td>30,616,22</td>
<td>39,780,12</td>
<td>42,891,019</td>
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<td>EUROPE</td>
<td>449,232,19</td>
<td>656,314,41</td>
<td>363,201,28</td>
<td>170,747,94</td>
<td>774,501,50</td>
<td>77,895,217</td>
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<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>121,995,31</td>
<td>620,428,48</td>
<td>019,747,39</td>
<td>719,127,78</td>
<td>819,880,51</td>
<td>20,121,711</td>
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<tr>
<td>Northern Europe</td>
<td>26,645,605</td>
<td>07,900,973</td>
<td>29,588,814</td>
<td>111,810,67</td>
<td>913,188,81</td>
<td>13,946,390</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southern Europe</td>
<td>4,340,454</td>
<td>7,517,054</td>
<td>11,974,33</td>
<td>616,205,44</td>
<td>315,850,49</td>
<td>15,957,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>16,250,82</td>
<td>20,467,90</td>
<td>421,890,74</td>
<td>423,604,04</td>
<td>625,601,68</td>
<td>27,869,485</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latin Amer./Caribb.</td>
<td>07,169,728</td>
<td>96,579,328</td>
<td>07,237,476</td>
<td>68,246,652</td>
<td>9,272,027</td>
<td>9,508,189</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multiculturalism

One key consequence of globalization and world interconnectedness is that people now have opportunities to compare their plights with others’ living thousands of miles away, and thus eventually becoming aware of their relative deprivation (Fotopoulos 2001). Against this backdrop, crises taking place here and there over the globe may encourage movements of population toward more prosperous and secure spots on the globe. The conjunctive availability of means of easy transportation offered by today technology creates the conditions that account for impressive contingents of migrants setting out for what they expect to provide a brighter future.

When settling in their new environments, these migrants contribute to the human landscape of those settings (James 2014). It is this ensuing cultural and social heterogeneity of populations that it is labeled multiculturalism – an aspect of society whose significance may concretize in the greatest variety of impacts. It is as such that we see here an additional mover of contemporary social and societal reality (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004). Multiculturalism already existed to various degrees in no few settings around the world before the surges of population movements in the last decades, but it has recently received particular impetus and amplitude. Over the past 25 years, the number of migrants in Europe alone has totaled close to twenty million (see Table 1).

Multiculturalism signifies a coexistence of different sociocultural entities in a same setting, and it is often evinced in the urban space by tendencies of people of the same origins – or of culturally close origins – to concentrate in certain neighborhoods. There, one often observes the growth of cult places, cultural centers, educational frameworks or political organizations. The way is short then to develop ethnic pressure groups on behalf of identity politics fighting for societal recognition and particularistic claims (McShane 2017).

Such developments may incite debates in the general public revolving around the question of whether or not multiculturalism is the appropriate way to deal with the integration of immigrants. These debates take place mainly in Western nation-states which, since early modernity, have mostly aspired to enforce a homogeneous (or homogenizing) national identity (Zarate et al. 2011).

Multiculturalism with its instutionalization of cultural communities as part of the social order is seen as a fair system by many contenders who defend the right of people to assert who they are and to adapt with precaution to their environment without denying their legacies. Western countries, Trotman (2002) contends, carry a tradition of resistance to racism, of protection for minorities and an ideology opposing discrimination in the access to opportunities. He
argues that multiculturalism is valuable because it promotes respect for the dignity of the non-mainstream. By closing social gaps and raising consciousness of the past, multiculturalism restores a sense of wholeness in an era that fragments societies.

Other authors, however, are critical of multiculturalism. They argue that nation-states, that have long carried distinctive national identities, lose out to multiculturalism which erodes national cultures. Putnam (2007), who conducted a large-scale study on how multiculturalism affects social trust, found that the more officially endorsed racial diversity in a community, the weaker the mutual trust between groups. In an effort of theorization, this multifaceted character of populations in multicultural settings leads some scholars to depict social reality as super-diversified. For Vertovec (2004; 2007), this super-diversity underlines that the coexistence of different groups and the variety of their possible configurations bring about specific distinct traits of sociocultural contexts. A multicultural reality, it is also asserted, may also weaken, however, the power of societal institutions to manage society (Glick Schiller et al. 1995).

Beyond these considerations, some researchers emphasize that recent migrants display new features compared to the past (Portes et al. 1999). Globalization offers migrants new means of communication that allow them to remain in uninterrupted contact with their countries of origin and with fellow-homelanders who settled elsewhere (Wimmer 2015). This eventuality joint to the evolving in democratic regimes, questions the availability of integrating society without necessarily disappearing as singular groups.

Some observers deny that such phenomena create genuine differences from previous waves of immigration (Van Hear 1998). While they agree that contemporary technologies facilitate sociocultural retentionism, they also contend that those facts are not new in themselves and, to a lesser degree, were already illustrated by past examples. Becoming different while simultaneously remaining somewhat the same has always been exemplified, at least for a time, by some groups of migrants (Castells 1996).

Contrary to that view, Smith and Guarnizo (1998) maintain that the unprecedented scope of contemporary developments justifies speaking of a new phenomenon that involves adherence to congregations, bonds to the “old” country, keeping to ostensible community markers, and last but not least, using original linguistic tokens (Wise & Velayutham, eds. 2009). All these without ruling out the inevitable adaptation to new surroundings, committing oneself to fresh allegiances, and acquiring a new language (Dufoix 2008).

These traits circumscribe entities responding to the notion of transnational diaspora. This concept is often attached to linguistic elements and selected
symbols (Jacobson 1995; Van Hear 1998). Immigrants’ original languages may fall into oblivion – and this happens quite often – especially among the younger generations born in the new environment. Yet, even then, typical keywords, idiomatic expressions, forms of greeting, and customary insults are still remembered and used in familiar speech. Some groups may be more strongly motivated than others to retain markers, especially when it is spoken of religious communities that attribute particular significance to those tokens. America’s Amish communities (Kraybill and Nolt 2013) are an illustration: after decades away from Germany, their country of origin, their members safeguard their customs and original old German. Even less resolute communities may retain forms of particularism thanks to cultural centers, temples, parochial schools, community publications, and media.

Some commentators argue, however, that more than a few groups show less resoluteness to remain distinct and rather aspire to weaken their visibility. To think otherwise presumably leans toward an essentialist approach that views collective allegiances as given for good, independently of circumstances and conjunctures (Bissoondath 2002). Empirical studies tend to validate both essentialist and circumstantialist approaches according to cases considered (Modood 2005), but the many confirm that multiculturalism is a favorable ground for tensions and controversies to flourish since it brings groups of different backgrounds face to face in settings regulated, often with difficulties, by public bodies dominated by mainstream elites (Fortier 2008).

Socio-cultural diversity was certainly acknowledged by Eisenstadt’s multiple-modernities paradigm. Though, it is our own conclusion that the impacts of multiculturalism on the evolution of society and the formation of transnational diasporas represent potential dialectic processes that, like globalization, draw out developmental perspectives that go beyond what multiple-modernities suggests. It is eventually spoken, in each specific setting, of a multiplication of collective identities, interests and political goals that fluctuate according to the players in presence, power relations and questionings of value premises of the social order. Constitutions spelled out in national states at the hour of their formation may be challenged by actors that were not expected then but who now create new cleavages glimpsing to new horizons – for the best or for the worst, if one may say so.

A consideration that turns the attention to the third mover of social reality that we have in mind: the national principle.
The national principle

It may be expected that globalization and multiculturalism impact on the institutions that identify a nation. The question is if these influences, following Sassen’s (2007) contention, imply a denationalization of what has historically been constructed as nations. For Urry (2003), the decline of the nation-state, itself an indubitable phenomenon, set doubts on the very idea that the notion of society concretizes in a clearly defined territorial space (see also New Scientist May 2017).

Though, while no few data tend to gainsay this peremptory assessment, at many a respect, the strength of the state is still an unquestionable focus of societal development. Table 2 shows, that state-structuration is even today a prominent social feature: civil servants up to now constitute substantial segments of the active population in all Western European countries.

Table 2: Importance of the civil service – Selected European countries (2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Numbers of civil servants a</th>
<th>Active populations b</th>
<th>% servants in active population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>2,951,000</td>
<td>27.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>840,000</td>
<td>5,006,100</td>
<td>16.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nederland</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>8,941,575</td>
<td>11.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1,125,000</td>
<td>5,446,700</td>
<td>20.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>18,998,400</td>
<td>13.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2,750,000</td>
<td>32,005,050</td>
<td>8.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3,400,000</td>
<td>26,064,215</td>
<td>13.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>5,500,000</td>
<td>17,212,675</td>
<td>20.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4,900,000</td>
<td>41,931,650</td>
<td>11.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5,200,000</td>
<td>29,207,125</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As Weber (1994) believed, this national principle is grounded on citizens’ assumed solidarity with national bodies. This responsibility implies, among other objectives, asserting cultural values and safeguarding the national language. It is true that in the eyes of some sociologists, like Anderson (2006), a nation is but an imagined community socially constructed. Though, even so, it is obvious
that this collective – assumed or real – involves a set of structures and resources referring to a given territorialized population. As such, the national principle was and remains a mover of social and societal reality of its own.

An outgrowth of modernity, nationalism consists of the set of ideas that justifies a nation’s identity, culture and language (Triandafyllidou 1998). In most cases, a nation is grounded on primordial and historical references. Though, like its ideology, a nation’s formation and institutionalization are marks of its entry into the modern era. They request from the population respect for collective symbols and allegiance to the State.

This national principle is fully adopted by the multiple-modernities paradigm: it is one of the markers of what is meant by the notion of a modern era. What is not fully included in the elaborations of the multiple-modernities paradigm is the intermingling of that principle with, globalization and multiculturalism. In other words, the significance of the variety of configurations these three facets may give shape to and the meaning each of these configurations may take on in social reality. It is the conceptualization of this conjunctive interaction between those three dimensions that we propose to view under the angle of the multiple-globalizations concept.

Multiple globalizations

The all-above follows from the assumption that contemporary social reality is widely – though not necessarily exclusively – given shape to by the cohabitation – even confrontation – of the three principal movers discussed in the above, that is, globalization, multiculturalism and the nation-state principle. Bringing to light the different configurations of the influences of those three movers in the ordering and framing of social life in contemporary settings may draw out the various kinds of intermingling of those movers. Do these configurations of influences appear more or less uniformly in the different spaces independently from the different population groups evolving in those spaces, or, on the contrary, do these different configurations distinguish these spaces clearly from each other? It is this problématique that is tackled by the notion of multiple globalizations as a major questioning of the study of the prospects of present-day societies.

We draw this notion of multiple globalizations from Eisenstadt’s (2002) conceptualization of multiple modernities. Eisenstadt used this latter notion to analyze processes generally included among the well-known features of moder-
nity – the de-freezing of social resources from particularistic frameworks, the rationalization of social and economic organization, references to populations of countries in terms of citizenship, the active participation of all in the public scene, the institutional building of nation-states’ apparatus, and in first, a principle of legitimacy of the social order assumedly grounded in the public will. What is new in Eisenstadt’s work is the acknowledgement that these processes do not necessarily delete all pre-existing orientations and social arrangements, and may therefore assume different modes of new-old arrangements and value affinities in diverse societies. Hence, illustrations of modernity may be recognizable everywhere to some extent, but at the same time modern societies also substantially differ from each other. This approach, as mentioned, is opposed to the long-range linear view of the developments of societies toward an identical format of modernity (Preyer and Sussman 2016).

We formulate a similar a priori contention regarding globalization. Our basic assessment is that the concretization of globalization – marked as it is by processes that interconnect national societies in numerous domains at the level of the globe, and by the heterogeneization of their populations – does not necessarily imprint a same model everywhere. In each specific setting, globalization can assume different emphases, paths, and perspectives under the constrains of particular material, political and cultural circumstances (Martell 2010). Not to forget that globalization also encounters everywhere national principles which may be formulated in different terms. The resulting variety of globalization models substantiates what we mean by the notion of multiple globalizations.

Our intention in the use this notion is to underline the newness of our time. Hence, we join to globalization the predicate multiple to emphasize that – like for modernities that are multiple – features of globalization that we encounter in different places also respond to multiplicity. Globalization consists everywhere of equivalent – though not identical – “materials” the configurations and combinations of which may be expected to display singularity in each particular example.

This reality of multiple globalizations may be captured and studied through many research strategies corresponding to diverse disciplinary stances and starting from assertions generated from very different angles. Each strategic approach aspires to contribute elements and assessments of its own to the substantiating of the materiality of multiple globalizations. It should enable us, on the basis of analyses of empirical data, to provide essentials for formulating a paradigm of multiple globalizations.

We contend that when captured in conjunction as one multifaceted set of movers, globalization, in its economic-consumerist sense, multiculturalism, in
its socio-ethnic sense, and the nation-state principle in the sense of its impact on the social order, offer a picture of social reality that hardly respond to the descriptions of modernity as apprehended by the *program of multiple modernities* that we learned from Eisenstadt (2003; Delanty 2007). The nation-state principle, it is true, fully accords with the multiple-modernities perspective. However, globalization and world interconnectedness, which it implies, conjunctively with the multiculturalism widely generated or amplified by transnational diasporas combine with the sway of that nation-state principle to make emerge “different” realities. The resulting diverse sets of possible configurations request, as a whole, a conceptualization of their own – under the heading, we suggest, of multiple globalizations.

This notion of multiple globalizations overlaps other tokens that we find in the sociological literature. Some authors have proposed *transglobality*, for instance, from different angles. Münkler (2007) uses this notion for depicting sources of power transcending the world and outer space. For Olupona (2003), transglobality is almost synonymous with diaspora transnationalism. Laguerre (2009) sees transglobality as the international interconnectedness of diverse circles of activities and entities that experience tensions with local interests.

The notions of globalization or globalism are also conceived by scholars in a variety of manners. It is primarily understood as the advent of a new economic era that may be understood, like in the work of Bhagwati and Panagariya Arvind (2014), as immense progress for world welfare or, contrary, in the following of Stiglitz (2014) as a development harshly detrimental for the non-Western world. Others – like Rodrik (2011) – emphasize that globalization is a power that endanger the importance of the nation-state in democratic countries and is, thus, to be customized in order to fulfill its promises of prosperity. Berger and Huntington (2003), as for them, discuss “many globalizations” as a set of diverse processes bringing about the emergence of a global culture that in their mind, displays a worldwide extension of values and norms binding the globe’s components together.

In our own view, the multiple-globalizations concept sustains the analysis of the conjunctive occurrences of phenomena attached principally to the three movers of reality we identified, and which we see as interacting facets of wholes consisting of distinct configurations. These three movers’ configurations are not just co-manifestation of different codes in the public sphere, but represent conjunctions of different orientations and horizons. Under this light, the co-occurrences of those movers bear tensions and, to a point, contradictory stances – an emphasis on international flows attached to globalization, assessments of collective particularistic identities, and allegiance to the nation-state principle.
The very co-incidence of these movers in different spaces evinces that they do not exclude each other, though their connection to different kinds of impacts on social settings reveals differing vistas.

These typical tensions in the landscapes of contemporary world-cities, we may pursue, articulate dilemmas embedded in essential social aspects (Paquin 2016). Multiple globalizations, as a concept, partially rejoins Martin Albrow’s (1997) theorization that describes globalization as the powerful factor in the homogenization of our world. Multiple globalizations adds to this formulation the focus on multiculturalism, and the retention of the nation-state principle that also participate in the present-day shaping of social reality. Moreover, multiple globalizations by no means implies a rupture with longstanding aspects of modernity and even pre-modern references; it signals the rise of new orientations that participate growingly in the making of society.

All in all, this approach sustains a view that the contemporary societal reality undergoes a gestation toward a new reality that is hardly reducible to the notion of modernity per se, even when conceived as multiple. In this sense, this approach gets close to the notion of next society beyond modernity as formulated by Preyer (2016) who reminds the use of this concept in the work of Drucker (2001). According to Preyer, this route leads to the view that the regulation of social integration gets determined more by self-guidance of social actors than by decisions of the center. In accordance with this emphasis, we view this route as multiple and not necessarily responding to one and unique model, and propose a theoretical move from multiple modernities to multiple globalizations.

Last but not least, it is also true that facts attached to distinct movers may leave an impression of chaos and incongruence (Urry 2002; 2005), but if only because of they are there, their perceptions by people may be associated with the idea of gestalt (Scholl 2001; Breidbach and Jost 2006). From this perspective, one may suggest an analogy with natural sharply diversified panoramas which from given spots, comprehend mountains, valleys, rivers, forests, and houses which are all parts of a same landscape and may thus be captured on a same picture. This gestalt draws from the appearance ensemble (“together,” in French) of possibly most discordant objects that, by their concomitant manifestations, yield the perception of un ensemble (one whole). This ensemble belongs to realities recognized by the notion of multiple globalizations.
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